NEW TIMES

September 10–16, 1991

Marx's *Capital* – a capital lie?

36

UK: £0.85
US: $1.40

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A SOVIET WEEKLY

NEW TIMES

No. 36, 1991
Founded 1945

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Cover by Victor Brel



We do not feel the presence of our country

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

Milovan Djilas, dissident No.1, talks in *NT* after 47 years

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Masons, masons, masons all around...

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Our address: Pushkin Square, Moscow, GSP, 103782, USSR. Telephones: 229-88-72, 209-07-67

NEW TIMES

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We have correspondents in
Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Delhi, London, Mexico, New York, Prague, Pretoria, Rome, Sofia, Stockholm, Tokyo, Vienna, Warsaw

Founders:
***New Times* journalists**

Published in Russian, English, German, and Italian

Printed by Moskovskaya Pravda Press. Telex: 411164a newt SU 411164b newt SU Telefax: 200-42-23, 200-41-92 Advertising Department: 209-92-82

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From our mailbag

■ I know how to use the statue of Dzerzhinsky, which is not standing on Lubyanskaya Square any more. We must organize a museum of useless statues and monuments. After the war, Moscow had something of the sort: a museum of captured military equipment. We visited it and examined the remains of the routed colossus. It was a visible manifestation of our victory. We could set up such a museum now, too. Dozens of torn down busts and statues – Lenins, Marxes, and Dzerzhinskys. A useful and educational exhibition, especially for children.

G. Osipenko
Moscow

■ Quite a lot has been said and written about the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Privileges. The strife began mostly around the country houses of people in the higher echelons of the Defence Ministry.

But not a word has been said either in the documents of the commission or in any other documents about the government-owned country houses of KGB leaders: its chairman, his deputies, heads of departments, and other generals.

Apparently this can be explained by the fact that the KGB is a top-secret organization, and members of the commission could not as much as approach the country houses of KGB leaders.

The KGB has secretly-guarded country houses known only to American intelligence due to satellite photographs. When Vladimir Kryuchkov was chief of the Intelligence, i.e., the First Chief Directorate of the USSR KGB, he built around two dozen dachas – two-storey-high mansions – near Yasenevo, just outside Moscow. The whole premises belongs to the KGB headquarters of the external intelligence and is protected with the help of electronics and a regiment of warrant officers.

At one time the construction of these country houses was justified by the claim that they were meant for the chiefs of intelligence departments from socialist countries and some other "fraternal" states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, who visited Moscow from time to time. But the number of country houses exceeded by far the number of visitors. Therefore, from the very start the dachas were used by Kryuchkov, all his deputies in the FCD, and heads of different intelligence departments – all of them generals. Since socialist intelligence services and the very socialist camp ceased to exist, the maintenance and exploitation of the dachas is not justified in a different manner – al the external intelligence bosses are working around the clock, revealing the perfidious schemes of the American CIA and its NATO allies, and to prevent them from rushing home and back to work, they are provided with personal cottages with spacious halls, bars, kitchens and refrigerators filled with food, with cleaning ladies and chamber maids. And in their rare days off, they can look

Mother's word

■ I belong to the generation which is now referred to as "the children of the war." For the first time since October 1941 I saw fully equipped soldiers up close. Only at that time they had greatcoat rolls on, instead of modern bullet-proof vests, and World War I rifles, instead of Kalashnikov assault rifles. That's what my father looked like – a Moscow volunteer who was urgently returning to his "special artillery division" on October 16, 1941.

I was a girl in my teens then and at night I kept vigil in the attic in case an incendiary bomb hit our house, or I spent nights in the courtyard or outside the doorway, checking the black-out. The troops kept marching to the front to defend not only Moscow, but the whole country.

August 19, 1991. Already a pensioner, I urgently returned from the country house as soon as I learned of the development in Moscow; although the Kaluga Region is not far from Moscow, we had practically no information there.

August 20. I went to my former place of work – to our *New Times* magazine to find out from more reliable sources than Central Television, what was going on. As most of the people of my generation, we cannot sit idle when the country is in trouble, we must do our best to help it. As I was passing the building of the Central Telegraph Office in Gorky Street, I saw young soldiers and armoured personnel carriers around the building. What were they protecting, and from whom? Perhaps from me? But I had nothing in my bag except some medicine (I have the same blood pressure as our former Prime Minister Pavlov: 200/100), some money, my passport, my pension book, and a certificate stating that on March 18, 1945, I received an award for the defence of Moscow. It was impossible to get to the stores through that line of combat vehicles. There were plenty of people in the street: some were carrying shopping bags, others had nothing at all. Everyone was addressing the soldiers with one and the same question. But what could they answer?

That evening I went to downtown Moscow again. My son is serving in the army now. I came up to the soldiers "defending" the entrance to the Alexandrovsky Garden.

"How long have you been serving, boys?"

"We're in our second year."

"When are you going home?"

"In the spring."

Museum of fallen idols

KGB generals hide behind a strong fence

The putsch proceeds, but soldiers sleep

after their kitchen gardens and fruit trees, and grow flowers. They are safely cut off form the rest of the world by guards and high fences impregnable not only for the Commission on Privileges, but even for rank-and-file intelligence workers, who likewise are not supposed to know about the existence of the dachas.

This is what budget allocations for the KGB and external intelligence are spent on.

A. Sergeyev
Moscow

■ Dear Mr Editor-in-Chief,

I am happy to pass on to you letters from Amir of Kuwait, His Highness Sheikh Jaber al Akhmad as-Sabah to M.S. Gorbachev, President of the USSR, and B.N. Yeltsin, President of Russia.

"Your Excellency, Mr President of the USSR, in these critical hours I'd like to express to Your Excellency our support and sympathy, as well as our sincere congratulations in connection with the trust the whole Soviet nation puts in you..."

"Your Excellency, Mr President of Russia, in this decisive period in your country's history I am very happy to express to you our sympathies and support for you personally and for the wise policy you pursue. I would like to congratulate you on the trust the Russian people put in you. Your courageous stance in defence of the Law and Constitution was received with admiration the world over.

Sheikh Jaber al-Akhmad as-Sabah
Amir of Kuwait

■ The article "The second advent" (No. 10/91) explains why people are attracted to the socialist idea like moths to candle light, and why they invariably perish upon contact with it. "All of us were drawn into a pursuit of illusions, all of us are victims of self-deception maintained by downright deception." The noble idea of justice burns in our hearts and pushes us towards violence. Because everyone has his own truth, his own justice, imposed on others in the guise of Universal Good and always turning out to be a sword or a truncheon. The official defenders of socialism are again on the war path. They have a new enemy now – pseudodemocrats. Oh God, weren't these our grandfathers, who separated themselves into the "whites" and "reds" and murdered each other in an attempt to quench the thirst for justice with blood? And aren't we splitting into "good guys" and "bad guys"?

I am very grateful to Soloveichik, who managed to show on three pages how and why we became the slaves of our own blinding passion, and how the great nation became both its own victim and hangman.

Gennady Postnov
Lipetsk, USSR

■ I am a former officer, I served in the army in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Then army officers were already discontent that the army was dominated by political functionaries and called them lords and loafers. I am for the complete depolitization of the army! It has no place for any bodies of party authority. Only then will the army meet the norms of the Constitution. The army should protect its people, the society, rather than the CPSU. It must defend the country's security, and not the socialist choice.

Rudolf Gorbunov
Tajikistan

Compiled by
Tatiana Chernova

THE WAY I SEE IT

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

"My dear boys, please remember that you swore allegiance to the people and the country."

"We know that, mother."

I couldn't fall asleep until 3 o'clock in the morning, listening to the radio. All the information I got was from foreign radio stations: about a burning tank in Sadovoye Koltso street, about a veteran of the Afghan war run down by a tank.

It rained all night. In the morning I rushed to the store to buy some meat and cook some broth for the picketers who needed hot food. I filled all the thermos bottles I had at home and rushed to the White House. For the second time this month I was carrying such heavy bags: on August 4, I visited my son who was taking the oath and I took the same thermos bottles with me to treat the whole barracks.

I was approaching the White House from the "Arbatskaya" subway station. The first line of tankmen defending the Russian parliament. I came up to the commander. He was very pale and dead tired. And his soldiers were fast asleep, like people who had honestly fulfilled their duty.

"We are not hungry. We've had a lot to eat. There are more pickets further on."

There were many of us, who were hurrying to feed those boys cold and soaked to the skin, who were drying their clothes at the bonfires, ready to go fight at any moment. Muscovites had brought so much food that if we, God forbid, had to defend the White House for a week, we would have had enough food. There were hot pan cakes and pies, wrapped up in warm clothes, tea and coffee in thermos bottles, sandwiches and milk.

I stayed there till the end of the morning session of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, because it was the only place where one could learn about the developments in the White House.

Three days in Moscow. There were not only Muscovites, but people from all over the country. The people have defended their president and government – and those whom we voted for at the elections must do everything in their power to save their people from humiliation and poverty.

Lidiya Glushchuk
Moscow

Post-putsch political drama continues

We are living in a state that is no more. Frankly speaking, I am not happy about it. After all, too ingrained is that habit of feeling to be citizen of what was great and once mighty. However, reality is such that the Union of Free Soviet Socialist, etc., does not exist. Even though it has a president. Even though it has a parliament, which, truth to tell, was not in place during the coup d'etat, when particularly needed.

Until latterly, the Soviet leaders failed to see, were loth to see, or pretended not to see that trifle, namely the absence of the country they were ruling. Trotted out at the very time that Union was no longer there were the bogies of chaos and catastrophe, should the Union disintegrate. There was no chaos. This was because, alongside of Union bodies of power and rivalling them were republican agencies which gathered strength and prestige until eventually they burst out in front. Indeed, the superiority of republican bodies over Union bodies was thrown into particularly graphic relief in the Russian Federation during the putsch.

In August 1991, the revolution that was started in 1985 as the intricate cumbersome evolution of one system into another – of which its initiators, then high up in the CPSU and the state, had no inkling – reached its climax.

The right-wing coup, as to whose likelihood Eduard Shevardnadze had served so great a warning, rocked the entire country, rocking out in many of us the remaining vestiges of fear and humiliating meekness, and transforming Moscow and Leningrad along with the Russian Federation into niduses of resistance and national pride. Meanwhile, after his three-day enforced Foros "holiday," Mikhail Gorbachev also underwent a rather breathtaking change, especially when dotting all the i's and quitting the CPSU, whose Central Committee

POLITICS

Country sans president yesterday, president sans country today?

Galina Sidorova,
New Times political observer

he personally disbanded. The central pillar of the totalitarian system collapsed. The post-putsch political drama continues.

Act one: the Supreme Soviet

During those days all there except for the Speaker seemed bedrock, though the signing of the Union Treaty by the nine republics which the putsch had blocked threatened to make the country's further lot unpredictable. Many republics rushed to declare independence, some seeking to escape retaliation and Union laws and edicts, thereby to rescue structures which had supported the putsch. On the other hand, the Baltic states entered a chapter of diplomatic recognition, when the West saw for itself that the Soviet Union no longer existed in its former shape. Meanwhile in the Kremlin, lawmakers discussed personalities, demonstrating an "in-the-kitchen" boldness when attacking Party structures, the more so as this was even encouraged. Especially zealous in this respect were those who earlier had apparently been afraid ever to whisper such things into the ears of their wives in the confines of their own homes. Nailed were the culprits and lauded were the heroes, though only one out of every five of polled Supreme Soviet members, as sociological survey conducted on August 28 shows, believed Parliament responsible for the tragedy. The *Soyuz* lobby, which kept mum on the opening day, now more frequently grabbed the microphones. To cut a long story short, Parliament conducted affairs as usual, adopting a resolution "On the situation that had been brought about in the country by the coup d'etat" plus another resolution regarding the agenda for the Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. It was expected that this event would continue Supreme Soviet discussions only in a still more conservative manner.

Act two: the Congress and Gorbachev

At this very moment the President intervened. Generally, I must say Gorbachev seems pleased when finding himself in a corner he impressively breaks out, sweeping aside all obstacles and laws in the process. This time he proceeded from such realities as the existing situation in the republics and the mood of the aggressively intransigent majority that was prepared at the Congress to block every shred of common sense. He heeded the desires of the republics and at a nighttime pow-wow, just before the opening, drafted along with the leaders of eleven of the fifteen republics – the Baltics and Moldova did not participate – a joint declaration and what in effect comprised an alternative agenda. Next morning Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev was authorized to stun the deputies with the "Statement of the Ten" – the Georgians after all did not sign. This document proposes inter-republican power structures to function over the transition period until a new Constitution is enacted and new bodies of power are elected on the basis of this new fundamental law. Further all republics desirous of doing so are invited to sign the Treaty of the Union of Sovereign States wherein each may independently determine its form of participation and also, regardless of their declared status, to conclude an Economic Union. Also proposed was a Council of Representatives of People's Deputies based on the principle of equal representation from the Union republics with 20 deputies each from among the USSR and the republican people's deputies, as delegated by their respective supreme soviets, who would then work out a new Constitution of the Union of Sovereign States, institute a State

Council, composed of the USSR President and top republican executives, and set up a Provisional Inter-Republican Economic Committee.

Meanwhile, the USSR people's deputies were to be content with retention of their status for the term for which elected.

The architects of this declaration plan to conclude an agreement based on the principles of collective security as regards defence in order to retain United Armed Forces and a dimension of military strategy and likewise overhaul the army, the KGB, the Interior Ministry and the USSR Procurator's Offices with an eye to republican sovereignty.

The participants in the future Union have reaffirmed all the USSR's international commitments and are to adopt a declaration guaranteeing civil rights and liberties regardless of nationality, residence, Party affiliation and political views, as well as the rights of the national minorities. The said document also proposes asking Congress to support applications from the Union republics to the UN to have their status as subjects of international law acknowledged and to consider the issue of their UN membership.

This, naturally, all means that the appropriate articles of the USSR Constitution will need to be provisionally suspended.

That immediately evoked allergy amidst the lawmakers. Indeed, there is much that conflicts with the operative Constitution. True, our present Constitution, and especially its recent amendments, were introduced as a means of blocking centrifugal tendencies at a time when such processes were already plainly inevitable. Though the Constitution outlawed them, it could not halt them, which incurred a never-ending clash with the constitutions and legislations of the renovated republics and which also served to have the law ignored generally.

A certain degree of dichotomy in the approach of the ten to the future of the new formation strikes the eye. Indeed, if they be sovereign states, then can we have a new Constitution for their Union? After all, each republic will have its own constitution. Which means it would be more logical to designate the Treaty as a code of rules and reciprocal commitments with respect to the relationships between these sovereign states. Also if each subject of the future Union is accorded UN recognition, then what kind of a status would the said Union enjoy in the eyes of international law?

It was clear on the opening day that recognition of the independence of all the republics currently within the Union could be tabled. It may have well been that Gorbachev could not rise above himself and announce separately recognition of the independence of the Baltic states. In the upshot, without this first move from his partner, US President Bush announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Baltic states.

The committee for short-term economic management, that was established right after the putsch, is conjuring up an integrated economic policy for the governments of the sovereign states and has already encountered attempts to seize the best options. How the present Union's state debt is to be apportioned out worries everyone. Some republics have announced the intention of introducing their own national currencies, which of course is how it should be, provided they plan to operate as sovereign states, but which, on the other hand, will greatly complicate overall economic strategy and anti-crisis measures.

Virtually all the republics have recognized the status quo as concerns existing borders. However, I think the national autonomies will yet have their say, which may produce a knottier situation.

How are nuclear weapons to be transferred from republics planning to become denuclearized states and where will such weapons go? What part of these weapons are to be destroyed, and where will that take place?

These are but a few of the problems that may arise. The community which the statement of the ten and the Union leader limns is more reminiscent of the British Commonwealth, with an honorary president instead of a crowned head. Only in our particular case this dignitary will need to discharge, in addition to the business of coordinating administrative functions, the mission likewise of heading a nuclear power in its period of half-decay.

Amateurs and professionals

The entire range of difficulties is further complicated by the totalitarian system's legacy, one that all of us possess within ourselves to a lesser or greater extent. One hears cries for more and more anti-communism, and one sees Communist Party membership cards being publicly burned in the theatrical style. We are taking revenge against our own past which actually, with its intolerance and viciousness, invades us and revenges itself. Instead of taking good care of the professionals, who are so essential today in all crucial areas of administration, professionals of whom there are so few amidst the legion of amateurs, we observe the delirious process of ferreting out "communist enemies" or a massacre time. The solution is by no means helped by the distribution of state offices as rewards for good behaviour during the putsch and for personal devotion.

Gorbachev's inability to understand what makes people tick cost both him and the country dear. As, too, did his desire to be surrounded by foils emphasizing his own merits. Today one thinks the country's image and the attitude to it at a time when it is disintegrating into fifteen independent developing states, which so greatly frightens our friends and partners in both Orient and Occident, will depend not least on the President's entourage, especially as regards foreign policy and external relations in the economic field. Needed in these areas are top-notch politicians enjoying prestige, respect and trust amongst our partners.

We are living in a country that is no more. Yet we are living in a country being born right now before our very eyes.



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

Boris Pankin:

That the diplomat is a yes-man is a misconception

When he joined the Foreign Ministry staff nine years ago his *curriculum vitae* included editorship of the 1960s daring-most newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and contradictory copyright agency (VAAP) experience. His appointment as Soviet Foreign Minister was both unexpected and logical. At this moment of truth, that is after the putsch, civic spirit and professionalism are debated also in our foreign policy HQ. What will Boris Pankin be like as the new minister?

When I entered the Soviet MFA doors on Moscow's Smolenskaya Ploshchad (square), the police guard asked me which minister I wished to see. That was the very first day of the new Foreign Minister's activity and the very first interview he granted in his new office was to *New Times*.

Q. Congratulating you on your appointment, I would first of all like to know how it all came about, and whether it was so unexpected?

A. It was absolutely unexpected. Today is Friday, but only two days ago, on Wednesday, I was still at the Embassy in Prague attending to usual affairs and had no idea that such a thing could happen.

Suddenly at around midday on August 28, I got a call from Mikhail Gorbachev, who asked me whether I could emplane to Moscow at once, as it had been proposed that I be made Foreign Minister. I said I could emplane at once, but I would have to think about the matter. Gorbachev told me to get back right away and see him as soon as I arrived. I entered the President's office but a few hours later and, as you can see, had not much time to think the matter over. Let me add that on this score the President was seconded by Alexander Yakovlev whose opinion I have always prized. Incidentally he was there when I discussed the matter with Mikhail Gorbachev. Later on, I spoke to Eduard Shevardnandze who promised me every support.

Q. When you arrived in Czecho-Slovakia last year I was in Prague at the time. I remember your immeidiately declaring your intent, repeating what Alexandra Kollontai had once said to the effect that a day on which no new friends were made for the country was a lost day. Though only a little over a year has passed, which is not so much, I khow that you have made many such friends. So how did they, including President Havel, take your new appointment. And what will your declaration of intent be like in this new office?

A. I think that from the very outset, as soon as I said I would do my best to atone for our sins as regarded the tanks of 1968, I got going a sincere relationship with the country leaders, one that with the passage of time grew closer and still more human. However, only after my anti-putsch declaration I saw that slim invisible barrier, whose very existence I have realized only now, had completely collapsed. Indeed, when two days after the smashing of the putsch, President Vaclav Havel had invited me and Minister-Counsellor Alexander Lebedev to voice such warm sincere views, which he subsequently repeated when learning of my new appointment. I asked him to forget for a moment that I was the Soviet ambassador, I said I appreciated that, but felt it rather embarrassing to hear it all from a man who had fought totalitarianism for 23 years for which incidentally he had been jailed in his time, but who had won out and who was now ruling the country with his friends and comrades.

As for my declaration of intent in this new office let me say that as long as this is the declaration of a human being that of a statesman would follow.

To this day I wonder how much needs to be done to get the shackles off, to eradicate the dogma and to overcome the stereotypes, in short everything which today, despite six years of perestroika, still causes us to differ from being a truly civilized.

Q. How would you explain the circumstance that the world media have underscored that your embassy was among the few not to recognize the putschists? Also how would you explain the MFA's mildly speaking ambiguous stand?

A. This continues to torment me. There is one thing though that I am sure about, and that is that the different characters cannot be sired up by applying one common yardstick. Though the MFA did have its "empire builders," who were responsible for the regress, for instance, in our relationships with Czecho-Slovakia, if implied is a common motivation, the simplest answer would be to note, as is now being said that it would have been fear of losing a sine cure. I would also note a definite automatic response and a distorted concept of one's obligations, reminiscent in its way of the attitude to the military oath. However no oath demands the committing of crimes against humanity. That the diplomat is a yes-man is a misconception.

Q. Shevardnadze resigned not because of any breakdowns or difficulties in foreign policy, but in protest against much that was taking place at home. How would you assess the present situation at home? And in what event might you resign?

Eduard Shevardnadze.
An outstanding politician and citizen, who has impressed his personality on the entire scope of Soviet foreign policy during perestroika. His experience will continue to be irreplaceable for the policy of openness and reintegration into the entire world

Alexander Bessmertnykh.
A career diplomat, who during the putsch had to cope with the far from professional problem of whether to preserve continuity in the democratic foreign policy by collaborating with the neo-Stalinist junta

A. The situation is tough both economically and psychologically. The impression is that the overall euphoria caused by the victory of the good over the evil, is already unfortunately clouded by a bitter revengefulness. Again bursting out are the devils of the dark miasma of our 70-year-old history. While it is unquestionable that all the culprits should be penalized according to the law, if catharsis is transformed into a massacre time, then all of our society, our entire people, will fall to the axe. How many times really can we stumble out on one and the same threshold!

As for possible resignation, I am happy to be able in spirit and brain, if I may put it that way, to dedicate myself to the wellbeing of the people in line with the principles enunciated in our foreign policy. Should other principles be declared, a different minister will be in office.

Q. It was the younger generation that brought about the present revolution, which still has no name – though Ales Adamovich proposed calling it "the revolution with the face of Rostropovich," I prefer calling it "the revolution with a human face." They joined up with the 1960s generation. Would you base your personnel policy on this kind of alliance?

A. I would call these days the Days of the Transfiguration. After all, according to the Church calendar, August 19 marks the Transfiguration of Jesus Christ. At the request of friends in Sweden, I wrote an article I headed "The Days of the Transfiguration." With kind mention once again of the tradition of the 1960s to whose generation the two of us belong, I would like to say that we are currently witnessing the emergence of the tradition of the 1990s. The tradition has been initiated by the youngsters who manned the barricades around the White House of Boris Yeltsin.

As for the principle of personnel selection, this is never to assess people by quantity and category. You can't imagine the times I have heard it said during my diplomatic career that career diplomats are good, and then that they are not, that only outsiders are good, and then again not. The gist of the matter is that each particular person is unique.

Q. Now as far as one can judge, we are going to have not one Foreign Minister, but fifteen plus one at best. Are you prepared to cope with that?

A. Certainly. After all, we always had that situation, only purely as a matter of form. Today this is a reality. Incidentally in both Stockholm and Prague, which last is closer to the present, I acquired experience in cooperating with my colleagues of the Baltic states, with Andrei Kozyrev, the current Russian Foreign Minister whom I am incidentally to see in an hour from now, and with Anatoly Zlenko, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister. After all, if EEC ministers can find a common language, cannot we do the same?

Boris Pankin
The MFA's new "old-timer," who has every opportunity of combining a civic spirit with professional diplomacy

Q. The putschists claimed that abroad Soviet people now feel themselves to be "second rate." Which was also one of the reasons why a state of emergency was promulgated. You have been a Russian abroad for many years now, so how would you comment upon that?

A. I would say that the putschists themselves were second rate. If the Soviets feel that abroad, that is the consequence not of perestroika's present stage, whatever it might be, but of the crisis phenomena afflicting our society. The smashing of the putsch pricked the boil and scattered the remaining suspicions, with such words as brotherhood and friendship again said by Czechs and Slovaks.

Q. Frankly speaking, would you call this your "starry hour"?

A. No. That euphoria, that feeling of freedom, all that Stefan Zweig called the "starry hour" I felt that very night when Alexander Lebedev and I, having composed our protest against the putschists relayed to our friend, the Czech ČTK journalist Miroslav Jelinek. That was an exceptional sense of freedom, although to be frank, earlier we felt alarm. The first time I experienced such feelings was when yet in my student years, we went up in a small PO-2 plane and I had to climb out on to the wing and jump. I was frightened as I looked down and saw student mates there below. But I realized it would be still more terrible not to jump. And so I jumped.

Inna Rudenko

From novice to doyen

The Soviet sub that went aground on Swedish shores provoked a crisis in relations between that country and the USSR. A diplomatic novice, the newly appointed Ambassador Boris Pankin had to save the situation. When he appeared in Stockholm in 1982, he was bombarded with acrimonious questions and backbiting by local officialdom. But when he left in 1990, besides being the doyen of the diplomatic corps, he enjoyed the repute of being the country's most popular foreign diplomat.

Boris Pankin had arrived with open eyes. He underwent a change and sought as best able to change the situation back home. Gradually he sought to transfer to Soviet soil ("regardless of the inclement weather") the achievements of Swedish society, from the IKEA furniture supermarket to Tetrapak packaging, from courses in Sweden for Soviet economic executives to getting Tsentrosoyuz, the Soviet co-op society, to borrow from the experience of the local "civilized co-operators."

Some three years ago he attempted to get the Soviet Union embrace the entire Swedish social model, by getting the governments of the two countries to set up a "round table" machinery for introducing Soviet economists and politicians to the secrets behind the functioning of a market economy and the system of social guarantees and structures of political democracy in social-democratic Sweden. He is not to blame that the attempts of curiously-minded Soviet officials to find out "why Sweden has everything and we have nothing" failed then to produce any practical results at top Soviet levels.

Boris Pankin was mocked when he sought to cover up all who with him or alone went ahead in their attempts to help the CPSU and USSR discard the Stalinist "revolutionary" interpretation of Marxism and embark upon a social-democratic road of social reform. I must admit that I called on him for advice when in reply to my *New Times* contributions, I was denounced by the "ministries and departments concerned" and always enjoyed his extraordinary and plenipotentiary support. Even when chucked out of the Soviet colony's Communist Party committee, Pankin refused to appease the emissary of the all-mighty CPSU Central Committee, namely the Party Committee Secretary for whom this office was a full-time job, declaring that no ambassador or military attache generally should have any political party affiliation.

He was censured more than once, especially behind the scenes. Now and again there was good reason for that. His subordinates and colleagues griped not only against his character. Indeed, in the smoking room of the Soviet Embassy, the career diplomats or smokers from the Soviet Trade Mission were always able to discover pretexts for criticism. However, Boris Pankin soon got the "hang" of Swedish life. He hunted with big businessmen and visited their factories, attended art exhibitions and theatrical first nights, frequently met Prime Ministers Olaf Palme and Carlsson and was good friends with Astrid Lindgren, the noted writer of books for children.

When Boris Pankin said farewell to Stockholm last spring, this "literary critic" was dispatched to Prague to "playwright" Havel in order to build up anew the USSR's shattered relations with Czecho-Slovakia.

Alexander Polyukhov,
our own correspondent
STOCKHOLM

Yeltsin and Gorbachev

The conspirators promised to "bring law and order," but in three days they destroyed the Union. The unsuccessful coup brought about the rapid rise of Boris Yeltsin. He was acknowledged not only at home, but abroad. But is Gorbachev's star falling?..

Leonid Vasilyev

The military coup of the communist nomenclature failed. There is already a lot written about that and there's sure to be a lot more. It can be assumed that each move of the conspirators and the conduct of those who helped and who took a position of well-wishing expectation towards them will be thoroughly studied. I don't intend to write about that, not about the coup itself nor the attitude to it of some or other persons or social groups. I want to analyze the possible and very likely consequences which, in my opinion, will inevitably follow the unsuccessful attempt.

Yeltsin's triumph

The first and most evident of them is the sharp rise in the rating of Yeltsin, the true hero of the people's resistance to the conspirators. Relying only on his charismatic authority and on the firm conviction that the people at the head of the conspiracy weren't supported and personified the doomed forces of former times, Yeltsin and his colleagues, assistants and advisers as well as his loyal electors conquered the powerful enemy.

The coup of the communist top officials was directed not against President and General Secretary Gorbachev. Even the choice of the junta members is indicative: there was not a single extremist or anti-Gorbachev Parliament leader (the group *Soyuz*, for instance), only Gorbachev's assistants carefully selected and even fervently defended by him (remember the difficulty in getting Yanayev approved as Vice-President) The junta came out against Russian democracy and against Yeltsin as its symbol.

Yeltsin showed great courage during the coup. He manifested will, self-control, decisiveness and acted as an outstanding tactician. He showed himself to be a statesman. And he displayed all these qualities under the most extreme circumstances when all eyes were on him and everyone could see who is who. And that was found out and seen by all, beginning with those who were next to or near him (I have in mind the many thousands of Muscovites whose unity and readiness to defend democracy played almost a deciding role in the failure of the conspiracy), and ending with the distant politicians, journalists and people of all countries who attentively followed the events in this country. Not Gorbachev, but Yeltsin was the symbol of our democracy in those days crucial for our country and for the world to a certain degree.

Today no one can have any doubt that Russia is no longer one of the 15 rightless republics of an all-powerful empire. I would even go so far as to say that today Russia, democratic Russia, under the leadership of the popularly elected president Yeltsin, who has proven his potential, is the rightful successor of yesterday's empire. The successor, not in the sense that Yeltsin is ready to replace Gorbachev as the leader of the centre controlling the Ukraine or Central Asia, but in that all-powerful centre of yesterday is no more.

The decline of Gorbachev

The second result of the failure of the conspiracy is the end of Gorbachev's career. Having arrived in Moscow on the crest of the people's celebration of the victory of constitutional law, the president, with his usual ability tried to squeeze out of the situation the maximum possible. But no matter how good Gorbachev is at political manoeuvring, and in our century he has no equal, it will hardly save the president.

Why did Gorbachev lose out? It's not that Gorbachev wasn't one who could surround himself with insignificant and mediocre people, and get rid of the competent (seeing in them possible competitors) and then stay on top. Not everyone can do that. Maybe the president believed he could and miscalculated. But the main reason for the downfall of Gorbachev is that he always wavered, was indecisive and therefore was always too late. For such a great politician this is not forgiven.

Gorbachev had no political forces on which he could rely. But why didn't he create them from his own party, many of whom quite recently, in the days of the peak of his popularity, were ready to follow him? It wasn't only because the all-powerful KGB, military industrial complex (MIC) and other organs fought against this. Their resistance could have been overcome, especially with the support of the people and the army. But Gorbachev didn't do this. He didn't even try. Instead he preferred to pin his hopes on the art of balancing. He thought that way he would create a kind of political

centre on which he could rely.

The pesident believed that he could create the centre and that its fluctuation from right to left and back again was the realization of the desired goal. But in reality the wavering led only to a tortuous dragging out of the agony of the regime. Tortuous, not so much for the regime itself – it could go on long thus without any hardship for its loyal servants, suckers of the people juices – but for the people from whom the parasites of all ranks suck the juices.

Today, when the conspirators have been thrown down and the structures headed by them must be decisively dealt with this, I repeat, structures decisive for the fate of the regime – the MIC, the KGB, the MIA (Ministry of Internal Affairs), the SA (Soviet Army) and the CPSU; Gorbachev, as can be guessed, will do all possible not to allow the organs, which got their deserts, to be changed or greatly weakened. And not because that would weaken the country – thank God now no one intends, wants or dares to attack us. But because it would weaken his position. And the president, I repeat, will try to use the fruits of victory of democracy and Yeltsin. It's not just a matter of the honour of Russian democracy, but the very life of the country and people – our future – not to allow this. Gorbachev has done his bit. History will be his judge. But to permit him to continue on in the same vein would be a crime. The best that he can look forward to, in my opinion, is being the president of a Union-Commonwealth with strictly limited prerogatives. I think that the victor, Yeltsin, with the support of the victorious Russian democracy and with the clear sympathy of all the rest wanting true, not paper, independence of the republics will see to this.

The Agony of the CPSU

The CPSU, its leaders and central (and even regional and city) bodies, totally exposed itself during the conspiracy.

The days of the coup showed that the CPSU is no longer a powerful political force though all the conspirators were members of the central committee of the CPSU. Of course, they had been indoctrinated by the party. It was the party that put into their heads those ideas and morals which led the junta to the coup. But, incidentally, they didn't ask the blessings of the politbureau, which would have been unimaginable several years ago. And the very members of the State Emergency Committee (SEC) didn't take the party seriously. And they were justified – in the course of the two days after the coup and practically to its end, the leaders of the CPSU couldn't agree how to react to the internment of the legimate president of the country, and, by the way, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Part of the party kept silent, the other actively helped the SEC, demonstrating that of its one time "ruling force" remained only separate groups of its members and the only difference between its members being that some were reactionary, and others very reactionary.

I could express myself more plainly. The CPSU inspired and organized that coup and only the refusal of the General Secretary to openly unite with the conspirators and thereby give the plot a formal presidential-constitutional OK forced them to violate the law which none of them took seriously. They thought in a week they would call an obedient parliament and it would recognize the coup and thus make the junta legitimate if it were not for the people.

Today the CPSU has been disbanded. Evidently only fanatics will remain who will occupy a place in the political life of the country analogous to that of their comrades in the USA, Britain or Germany. A new party is likely to come on the scene now with a social democratic orientation and the appreciable electorate.

Non-communist democratic Russia

Russia must be democratic. And to be so it must do away with the important institutions of Marxist

socialism – with what the Bolsheviks so thorougly set up (by no means just Stalin!). We're speaking of the bodies of terror, about the party of a "new type" taking over state rule, about subordination namely to this party, not the people in the person of its representative organizations, and the KGB, the MIA, the SA, the procurator's offices and courts and all the rest.

Today, at the moment of its highest achievement, Russia and its leaders must first of all see to it that it uses this chance and doesn't allow all these institutions at the Union level to reorganize without the deciding role and daily participation of the Russian democracy in this process. I am convinced that the all-Union KGB with all its departments can't, shouldn't exist. The committee must be disbanded and dismembered with a greater part thereof reoriented. All regiments, the more so divisions subordinate to the committee must be totally liquidated – is it necessary to mention that namely the Sevastopol regiment of the KGB blockaded the president in the Crimea during the coup. The Ministry of Internal Affairs with all its departments must be transferred to the republics – the all-Union MIA doesn't have the right to exist any more. The procurator's offices of the USSR aren't needed. They never served the law, but the Central Committee of the CPSU, carefully protecting the corrupt party bureaucrats from being exposed. As for the MIC, then the decision of the republics to transfer all enterprises on their territories to them should certainly be supported. That would cut off all 15 heads of the terrible dragon living off our backs. And finally, the army deserves special attention. Of course there can't be a strong state without a strong army. But the army, that is, its generals and a significant number of officers showed that they aren't serving the people. That mustn't be endured any longer. The republics have already announced they are creating their own armed forces – and nothing can prevent them now after the failure of the coup. So what'll become of the all-Union army? I think it will only retain functions of global significance (rocket-nuclear defence and the like). All the other functions should be transferred to the republics.

What's the future of the Union

It was the fate of the Union in connection with the new Union agreement that triggered the coup. Imperial thinking was what formally ruled those who stood for a strong state. But it wasn't just a matter of imperial thinking which in recent times often and quite successfully disguised itself patriotism – from the patriotism of the pioneers and veterans to the patriotism of some of the writers and anti-Semites of *Pamyat*. The main thing however is not thinking but interests. Too many people, whole social strata, long and heavily sponged off the imperial nature of our country.

The republics already understood this. The failure of the coup opened up opportunities to them they hadn't dared to even dream about before. Now they could boldly raise the question of creating their own armed forces and do so. In the current situation our Union will probably not be a federation (I don't think one should even dream of that now – let's hope that at least our Russia remains a federation!), not even a confederation (confederational ties will be retained between just a few republics at best), but a Commonwealth similar, if not to Britain, then to that planned in Western Europe in the near future.

So far, as is known, democracy has the upper hand, but the forces of the reaction, unfortunately, aren't yet vanquished. If the forces of democracy stay in power, the Union won't have its usual form. If they don't stay in power there may be a tragic return to a strong Union centre.

Speeding up the economic reform

The failure of the coup meant a weakening of all those forces which actively held up our economic reform and on account of whom our president, eternally wavering and seeking a new-existent balance, turned down one radical reform project after another. Today the time has come when a radical reform can be carried out in Russia, and not the Union. Today, when the cabinet of ministers has been discredited because of sits connections with the conspirators, today when the republics have announced the nationalization of the all-Union industries, today when all levers are in the hands of the republics – who, if not them, should begin radical economic reform, of course after agreeing with each other! Today, it is possible to again return to the already prepared project of Yavlinsky which gives us the hope to expect energetic and wise help from the developed countries (after crushing the putsch these countries **gladly,** that should be emphasized, will give aid to Russia). When, if not now, will the radical economic reforms ever be carried out?

Now, with the weakening of the centre, Rissia is becoming the most likely successor. In short, today Russia, democratic and having dealt a blow at the coup attempt, knows the ropes, as it were. Not to lose the chance is the thing now!

It goes without saying that Russia, due to its location, its size and a number of other parameters occupies a special place among all the republics. But it should no longer be determined by the fact that the Union centre, the centre of the great commuinist empire is in Russia.

I am sure that Yeltsin and his advisors, ministers and representatives will act mainly along this line. I am sure that all who are able to make reasonable amendments will cooperate mainly with Russia and not with the president nor his bankrupt cabinet of ministers.

Where was the Army?

Simon Kordonsky

**We must understand that the Soviet Union has no army. It has units, officers, generals, enlisted men, tanks and guns
But it has no army...**

A nice brick house is being built near the Profsoyouznaya metro station in Moscow. The builders, enlisted men from the Corps of Engineers, ask passersby for cigarettes and money or something to eat... At a post office, a General Staff colonel sends a thick was of postal money orders and gets back an incoming wad of orders – twice as thick. When confronted with puzzled stares from the people around him, he says he participates in the Apparel lottery. Later he confided that the General Staff, the General Staff Academy and some of the top brass from the Defence Ministry organized the lottery under the cover of an obscure society of Afghan war veterans and were pumping in money... General Dudnik has retired. General Vladimirov, the author of many good books on modern strategy is out of active service. Lieutenant-Colonel Yushenkov is busy organizing the defence of the White House of Russia, General Lebed takes the side of the Russian government. This is not a bad dream, this is the Soviet reality in which only 60 out of one hundred military vehicles arrived at their destination after a 300-kilometre march along a very good highway. The others broke down – not in the Kuwaiti desert, but in Lithuannia.

Soviet citizens have the habit of derogatorily defining their country without involving themselves or people who share their views. In the Soviet armed forces the structure of the state and its invariant qualities are highlighted because they are fixed in manuals and do not allow any deviation from the rigid system of ranks and positions. This structure, which allows the military to regard the civilian population as profane, is guarded by such authors as Prokhanov, Karem Rash and other bards of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The territorial-branch structure of the Soviet state in which there is a Communist Party committee at every intersection of the region and the branch is hyper-developed in the armed forces. Members of the military council of a military district are simultaneously members of bureaus of territorial party committees, while first secretaries of the territorial party committees sit in military councils. No decision, no order can be made or given without the approval of the bodies of political administration, the notorious Glavpur, the armed forces' political indoctrination department which have enjoyed the status of a CPSU Central Committee department. Added to this absurdity which has turned the army into a division of the CPSU apparat must be the party organizations which have the right to punish and to pardon, to hold independent investigation and to pursue autonomous policies. Army units are stationed in regions. In this country there exists a hierarchy of regions: there are exclusive cities like Moscow, first-degree regions and republics, down to second-, third- and fourth-degree ones. There is a similar hierarchy of Armed Forces branches and military districts. There are first-, second-, third-, and fourth-degree branches, combined arms and services districts. border guards districts and air-defence districts.

The hierarchy of branches and territories where units are stationed, combined with the general territorial-branch party structure of command, produces so much confusion that it is

understandable only to those career officers who have experienced all army hardships and humiliations themselves and who refuse to believe that the problems of the army can be discussed by people who have not been beaten up or gang-raped. It is only natural for people who have been through the inferno to look down on those who haven't.

The structure of armaments in the armed forces is vastly defined by the military hardware designers' personal connections in the party apparat and the many years of NATO's misinformation fed to us in order to make us adopt the least promising weapons systems. The catastrophic situation with the information support of the armed forces makes it impossible for them to be actively employed in technotronic warfare.

Officers and enlisted men are badly fed. The whole world laughed at the show put up by the Soviet top brass in the Far East shortly before the abortive coup: as the American visitor, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell watched, Soviet enlisted men were gulping down canned beef which the German Bundeswehr had donated to the USSR from its stocks that had exceeded the shelf life. By the way, the beef had been intended for the sick and hungry from among the civilians, not the army.

An economic space for generals

Life would be impossible in the unprecedentedly complicated system. To help people survive and live on, a special exchange system was formed in this country to replace what in civilized nations is known as the free market. In the socialist state system, exchange relations provided for the survival of branches, regions, enterprises, organizations, and private citizens, functioning in various forms from the usual everyday pilfering from one's workplace to massive organized crime. The CPSU apparat which served as the integrating element of society has become the concentration of exchange relations. It was through the CPSU apparat that all deals were concluded and exchanges agreed on.

In civilian life exchange relations were at least under nominal control, because they existed for everyone to see. The closed character of the army resulted in the whole army's life becoming an endless chain of exchanges, interdependencies, and gathering of compromising material for one another. Naturally, participants in exchange relations cash in more handsomely, the higher are their ranks and positions. The attempted investigation of the sources of marshals' and generals' more than comfortable life must have been a powerful incentive for them to try and fail to reverse history to socialism.

The combination of a rigid, formal, and essentially party structure, on the one hand, and the flourishing of exchange relations, on the other, provides any servicemen with a very special freedom, an opportunity to behave in each concrete situation not like the orders or manuals command, but so as to derive maximum profit from his position in the system of exchange relations in the party and bureaucratic hierarchy. This freedom with a criminal colouring was the basis of the Soviet marshals' daring decision to stage a coup. This freedom became the reason for the coup's failure when officers and generals refused to obeey their commanders and behaved the way their instincts told them to.

In my opinion, the coup attemp was connected with the top brass' desire to preserve the only economic and political space in which the Soviet armed forces can exist – the party leadership and exchange relations. The failure of the coup has demonstrated that the Soviet army is absolutely powerless.

Without the party cement?

The system of military development is incredibly cumbersome and absolutely unsuited to the solution of combat missions proper. The military planners' thinking has stagnated on the primitive level of the Second World War. The military leaders' criticism of the second volume of the *History of the Second World War* and the dismissal of the democratically-minded General Volkogonov from the editing process has showed the direction the interests of military theoreticians were projected. The defeat of Iraqi

extremists who were trained in Soviet military academies and armed with Soviet-made weapons has led those theoreticians to conclude that the main thing was the "human factor". Had there been proper political indoctrination, they thought, the Hussein troops would have eventually crushed the Americans.

In the past years the territorial-branch structure of the state has been deteriorating as a result of the CPSU's gradual ouster from power. It is evident that the Soviet Union does not and will not exist in its old form. Whatever the new Union Treaty may be like, it is obvious that the relations between the Soviet Union's constitutent republics will never be the same again. In the past few days the question of the Communist Party's leading role has finally been settled. Without the CPSU cementing them, the Soviet armed forces may disintegrate into fragments unable to exist independently. The possible associated NATO membership of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; the formation of a sanitary cordon on the Soviet Western borders with the help of the fugitive Baltics which will have joined the European Community; the upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism and the obvious gravitation of Central Asian national-patriotic movements to Iraq, Iran and Pakistan and the possible aggravation of relations with China are creating a radically new geopolitical situation. In this context, Russia, or what remains of the USSR, will have to have a well-trained army that can fight a technotronic war.

It's time we understood that the Soviet Union has no such army. There are units, servicemen of various political affiliations, officers and generals who have tasted the bitter defeat of Afghanistan, enlisted men who have experienced the almost Gulag-like hardships of the service, some weapons systems and even weapons for mass destruction. All this is located in regions constantly conflicting with each other for food, fuel, and land. This is the material which will be available to the new generation of citizens with which to create a real army that will be able to defend the country from any external enemies and will remain neutral in any political and ideological conflicts inside the country.

"We'll fire at people and crush them"

With these words the commander of the leading regiment of the Bolgrad division met a Moscow Soviet delegation on the Minsk highway

When the delegates from the Moscow Soviet's group for emergency situations asked Lieutenant-Colonel Prutchenko to read the Russian President's decree cancelling the putschist's decisions as unlawful, he crumpled up the sheet of paper given to him and threw it into their faces.

Most of the troops driven to Moscow on armoured vehicles did not know what had really happened and together with their officers they explained their appearance in the city by an order from superiors. On the first day of the putsch crowds of people surrounded the armoured personnel carriers standing in Manezh Square. A major pestered with angry shouts of protesters pulled an empty magazine out of his pistol and vowed that the troops had not been given an order to fire on Muscovites. Such an order was not given, indeed, but those who could issue it had no doubts that, if given, it would be carried out. The system of training dutiful soldiers who were forbidden to reason for themselves has been developed over decades.

The next day, after the coup had petered out, *New Times* staff writers met with members of the coordinating council of the Military for Democracy movement. Many of them had been expelled from the armed forces for leaving the Communist Party or simply for democratic views. *New Times* put only one question to them: why did troops obediently follow the putschists and get ready, if ordered, to fire at people and crush them?

"In the civilized world," Lieutenant-Colonel of Justice Anatoly Pchelintsev said, "there are legal guarantees against the execution of an unlawful order by servicemen." For instance, the oath taken by an American soldier provides for mutual responsibility for the execution of an unlawful order, that is, an American soldier can disobey an unlawful order and apply to an inspector independent of the Defence Secretary. He can be sure that he will not be punished for disobeying an order while his application will be brought to the notice of the inspector-general and higher military authorities.

A similar practice existed in Russia. By a decree issued in 1724 Peter the Great allowed soldiers to disobey a criminal order, that is, an order directed against the legitimate power, the tsarist family. A soldier could report the criminal order given to him to higher authorities, the prosecutor-general and the tsar himself. After the October 1917 Revolution the Red Army regulations issued in 1919, 1920 and 1925 stated that a criminal order ought not to be carried out.

However, the building of a totalitarian regime called for an absolute fulfillment, by the army, too, of decisions taken by the high leadership of the country. Article 7 of the Disciplinary Manual of 1940 said that any order ought to be carried out and a commander could force subordinates to execute his order even by using arms.

When Nazi criminals were brought to trial after the war, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal was drawn up on the Soviet Union's initiative. It pointed out that an order directed against peace and humaneness as well as against a lawful government ought not be fulfilled. However, this phrase did not appear in Soviet documents. The Disciplinary Manual of the Armed Forces of the USSR says: "An order issued by the chief is a law for his subordinate. It must be carried out without demur and by the fixed time."

"The text of the oath taken by servicemen has no mention of allegiance to the people and the Motherland," Major-General (reserve) Vladimir Dudnik said. "Instead, we swear allegiance to the Defence Minister, for one of the points of the oath states point-blank: 'I pledge to fufill all orders of commanders and chiefs.'"

Victor Kuznetsov, Colonel of the Reserve, recalled a phrase from his conversation with Lt-Gen. Sitnikov, head of the political department at the Lenin Military Political Academy. "We must cultivate respect for authorities, for even the Nazis did the same. Are we

worse than the Nazies?" He had in mind political and party rather than state authorities.

For control over commanders, and hence the army, by the party the institution of commissars was introduced during the Civil War. The commissars were guided not by laws but by party instructions. In the opinion of Colonel of the Reserve Vitaly Kovalevsky, "the political bodies in the rmy have been and remain none other than party authorities vested with state power, bodies of political coercion and suppression surveillance and investigation." The army has 1.1 million Communists united in 37,000 party branches.

Following the Decree on Military Political Bodies, signed by President Gorbachev last January, and in the course of the ensuing reform it was established that from then on political officers would have the task of "educating servicemen in the spirit of devotion to the policy of the state." The responsibility for such education was laid on Col-Gen. Shlyaga, head of the Chief Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy, who was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defence. But, in effect, little has changed. The Army Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chief Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy were "twin brothers."

There was no order to shoot, but generals had no doubt that if given, such an order would heve been carried out by soldiers

Vows of allegiance to the President of the USSR were made at a national conference of party secretaries of the armed forces held a week before the coup. A few days before the coup the same vows were also made by the leaders of the army committee of the CPSU. However, right after the coup the party branches of the armed forces were ordered to mobilize Communists to carry out the decisions adopted by the State Committee for the State of Emergency.

"All the malaises of our army came to light during the putsch," Lieutenant-Colonel of the Reserve Vladimir Andreyev said. "The worst of them is deception of the people by political bodies, because they serve not the people and the homeland, but the interests of the Communist Party. revolution in October 1917 most generals of the Russian Army remained loyal to the Tsar and Motherland. In August 1991 the Soviet generals backed the junta on the first day of the coup.

"The mechanism of strengthening the party's influence in the army was worked out thouroughly," Colonel of the Reserve Yuri Deryugin said. "A political instructor in the rank of colonel or lieutenant-colonel was removed from a division to the Central Committee apparatus in which he underwent political and ideological training and brainwashing. An ideologically staunch party functionary was moulded. Then he was returned to the army and appointed to work in the personnel department, in the intelligence, the military tribunal, the chief military collegium or the military prosecutor's office. In this way the legal, political and military power was concentrated in the hands of party functionaries. A powerful military and party elite was also shaped in this way. The members of the elite naturally selected people of the same spirit, manner of behaviour, ideas and language."

When marshals begin to shoot themselves the society becomes enlightened. Measures have at last been taken to create a reliable mechanism of civilian control over the armed forces.

In the opinion of Yuri Deryugin, one of the primary tasks is to "clearly define the functions of the Defence Ministry. It should play the administrative part and act as the general staff to work out tactical and strategic planning. The Defence Ministry should be headed by a civilian. The officers' assemblies, recreated recently, should become democratic bodies of self-government. Soldiers' assemblies should be established, too. It is necessary to guarantee the legal protection of privates. Three services – military legal, socio-psychological, and recreational – must be formed in the army instead of the abolished political bodies. It is necessary to introduce a religious hour for believers and the time has come to set up the institution of chaplains," Yuri Deryugin said in conclusion.

In my opinion, the time has also come for officers – members of parliament – to retire from the ranks or, if their military career is dear for them, to withdraw from the parliament.

Konstantin Isakov

Another revolution

Leonid Ionin

Post-revolution euphoria continues, which is only natural. But dangerous as well...

Even a non-believer will say today that the Almighty has turned his blessed gaze on Russia. After all, there is no logical explanation for the failure of the diabolic intrigue conceived by the conspirators. Some say that the plotters lacked professionalism. But why? These people can hardly be reproached with lack of professionalism or with indecision and hesitation to kill. Readiness to kill is in the genes of a Bolshevik. We are told that both the flag and the red tie of a Young Pioneer are drenched in human blood.

Others say that the plotters' schemes were cut short by the people who took to the streets. Quite a few stayed at home, however, and even if there had been ten times as many people, they would not have been able to thwart the plotters' schemes. Popular indignation cannot stop tanks.

Still others say that the issue was decided by the part of the army which did not support the plotters. However, the army's behaviour at that time is still unclear and controvercial. Tank columns rumbled along Moscow streets. Guards units, rumoured to have been sent to storm the Russian White House, protected the building instead and then unexpectedly withdrew "in the general direction of Tushino," as Radio Liberty reported. **Negotiations** were held with the generals in direct command of the troops. What were those talks about? One thing is clear: the army was not under orders to shoot and, perhaps, for this reason didn't.

So there is nothing for it but to attribute the inglorious end of the coup to Soviet generals' and Party plotters' soft-heartedness. This is an obvious absurdity. I am rather inclined to think that it was the Almighty who saved Russia. Or, using plain language and casting all mysticism aside, we – each of us, the nation, the world – have been incredibly lucky.

What a revolution is made of

A revolution is not the overthrow of one leader by another. It is a phenomenon in a nation's life, even if only a fraction of the nation is involved in it. A revolution is made of emotional material of a purity seldom encountered on earth. Those who erected barricades across Moscow streets, who stood guard at the Russian Supreme Soviet building all night long, who brought food to the defenders of that building or simply picked up branches and planks for camp fires – all of them had one passion in common, a pure and noble passion for freedom which delivers everyone from the fetters of his individual biography, nationality, education, views, way of life, and which brings everyone together into a closely-knit human community.

This is not what the Bolsheviks (and, in general, traditional historians and sociologists) meant by a social revolution carried out by a certain class, a social group, or an oppressed nation in its own **interests.** A Western ambassador's wife and an old Moscow woman (one of those who, in non-revolutionary times, spend ther days on park benches gossiping about their neighbours) brought food to the White House. Scientists and tough characters of dubious professions found themselves this side of the barricades. A man waving a Bulgarian flag was spotted in the crowd. A German professor and the wife of a high-ranking diplomat called their Soviet friends after sleepless nights spent at the White House, to say, "Thank you for letting us be with you on those nights and days." In other words, "Thank you for the lofty emotions which you have allowed us to share with you."

Those days and nights were both tragic and supremely blissful. Even at the tensest moments, the tears shed by the people determined to hold out were happy ones. For however the events culminated (and one always hopes for the best), such a sense of unity is so rare and so elevated that it rewards one for his past and illuminates the farthest reaches of his future.

This is not the whole "composition" of the revolution, which also includes horror. Most of us have seen documentary sequences showing the outlet of a traffic tunnel disgorging tanks enveloped in flames, which looked like subterranean monsters. And for those who came to Moscow after the events the horror materialized in the warped and charred carcasses of trolley-buses still blocking the tunnel, although the monsters have long since withdrawn to their holes.

The happiness of a revolution consists in a concentration of emotions and wills. It is the happiness of sharing in an exciting experience. On the other hand, horror comes from disintegration and dissociation. Tanks were creeping in to divide people, to cut them off from one another, to prevent them from joining hands. The curfew was imposed for the same purpose. People do not go out in the dead of night to shop or to see a movie: they do so to join one another.

There was more to the horror of those days than the horror of confronting tanks in the centre of Moscow. Families, friends, lovers and colleagues were in danger of **total** separation. The spectre of the past revolution and of the past civil war loomed before us. I am not exaggerating. The Bolsheviks are so in love with their history that they do not let us forget even the most tragic detail. This is why the horror of broken families, of broken loves and friendships (brother in the south, sister in the capi-



Drawing by Peep Pedmanson

tal, husband abroad, wife in Russia, the agonizing impossibility of moving across the vast expanses of the country which have become hostile all of a sudden), this horror of separation is still alive, and all the past decades have detracted little from it. Late last month it came dangerously close to materialization.

Like the bliss of unity, the horror of dissociation is not a class, national or "private" feeling, but a universal human feeling. Its intensity does not depend on nationality or social status. Therefore the fear of dissociation, just like unity for the sake of freedom, can rouse people to many glorious deeds.

And here is another important thing. The above-mentioned feelings, as pure as those witnessed by the historic three August days are, unfortunately, short-lived. As a poet put it, such a passion "keeps receding but never lasts." These feelings remain in the **memory** of the people who have experienced them as emotional peaks, but they cannot be revived again and again in all their purity. Their intensity is so great as to render them timeless even as life, now divided into the "revolution" and "after-revolution" periods, resumes its mechanical pace.

What politics is made of

Politics is made not so much of ideals, as of concrete human objectives, life plans, noble and base motives. People are not always aware of this simple truth, with the result that post-revolutionary politics is often made of surrogate revolutionary feelings. Consequently, the transition from the revolutionary to the post-revolutionary period turns out to be extremely ambiguous and dangerous. Dangerous for those who were directly involved in the revolution (i.e., who erected barricades, went on strike, protested, or just took to the streets during the midnight curfew) and for the leaders of the revolution alike.

The former seek to prolong revolutionary euphoria and, at the same time, to recover from the horror which has all but crushed them. For that purpose they are recreating, now mechanically, the external condition of unity – the mob. It is this mob that pulls down monuments, shatters window panes, and breaks into the most hateful buildings. At best, it reproduces revolutionary feelings in huge non-violent demonstrations. In these demonstrations , with tens and hundreds of thousands standing and marching shoulder to shoulder, people recover from the horror of disunity. And it is also in these demonstrations that the surrogate revolutionary feelings are stirred up.

These surrogate feelings are needed not only by the crowds, but by the leaders of the revolution as well – for their political purposes.

Revolutions are carried out on the crest of the tidal waves of social movements. And the movements live only as long as they move (excuse the tautology). As soon as revolutions are over and stable political organizations – parties – are formed, the movements die. And then amazing things begin to happen – what is commonly referred to as the degeneration of the revolution.

This has been born out by the record of the past centuries. Degeneration is not due to the fact that the people who have carried out a revolution are bad and insincere or that their feelings, even at the most ecstatic moments, were feigned. Not at all. Simply, as the movement gains momentum, its aim – be it freedom and democracy or national liberation – is the same as the personal aim of each of its participants. *Each and all of us want the same thing.* But the moment the revolution has been carried out, the movement has attained its objective and becomes a party – even the ruling party, perhaps, capable of stabilizing political life – that very moment the aims proclaimed by the movement and the concrete aims of its participants begin to drift apart. Some are to elect and others to be elected, some are to rule, and others – to be ruled. The former unity of purpose is torn apart by motives alien to the revolution but not alien at all to everyday life – status, prestige, self-interest, elementary emotions such as envy. *As a crowd, we want the same thing, but as individuals we have different aims in life.* This is an entirely different game, even though under the same noble slogans.

The leaders of the victorious movements have a limited choice. Two options are possible. One is to surrender to the mercy

of democracy, i.e. to put themselves on the same footing with other actual and potential leaders, to draw up programmes, to hear out the rivals' arguments, to defend themselves, to be prepared to explain and justify their actions because there are no unerring leaders. Ultimately, they should be prepared to go, if worst comes to worst.

The other option is to pretend that the movement continues to exist, that the revolution continues. In that case, the leader of the movement is not a "formal political leader," as sociologists say, but "one of us," an honest and straighforward ordinary person like any one of us. As such, he is above criticism and reproach.

Surrogate revolutionary feelings play a crucial role here. The leaders need the demonstrations and the demolition of monuments as much as do the thousands upon thousands of the "rank-and-file" who swarm, with their ropes, around the pedestals of bronze and marble colossuses like thousands upon thousands of others who swarmed around other monuments thousands of years ago. And while old monuments are being destroyed, new ones are imperceptibly going up.

Bolsheviks, the past masters of the permanent revolution, were extremely good at that. I am referring not to Trotsky's theory but to the "Revolution Is Going On" slogan which had once inspired people to accomplish feats of valour – only to degenerate into an object of ridicule later on. In the seventies, our young Komsomols still sang naive songs like: "Lenin is young again, and a new October Revolution is ahead!" As a result, the ruthless and vicious system of oppression was given the semblance of a revolutionary movement, and any crook who found his way to the top became a "leader."

Today there is nothing more dangerous than surrogate revolutionary feelings, whether spontaneous or artificially stimulated by the leaders. True revolutionary feelings are remarkable in that they are isolated, unique, and incompatible with routine. The revolution is not going on. Desirable and beautiful as the revolution is, "it keeps receding but never lasts," like love does in a Pasternak poem.

Prerequisites for luck

At the beginning of this article I remarked that all of us, the nation and the world, have been lucky. There were objective prerequisites for that good piece of luck, however. The mentality of **both** sides – the Party and the people – had changed over the perestroika years, and this, ironically, is the only thing they have in common.

On those days in August, something entirely new happened: people came out in support of the **legal,** even though long unpopular, President. The campaign against the conspirators was headed by Yeltsin, but that was a campaign under the slogan of reinstating Gorbachev as President of the USSR. It hardly matters now Mikhail Gorbachev's political career proceeds further, whether he runs for President in the coming direct and universal elections. The important thing now is that in the turmoil of that highly eventful week, behind the short-lived junta's impudent claims, Yeltsin's heroic feats, and the Muscovites' spontaneous enthusiasm one could clearly discern the contours of new democratic institutions, still young but steadily gaining in strength.

Things could have worked out in an entirely different way. Upon toppling the junta, Yeltsin might have become an "autocrat," figuratively speaking. That would have been only natural and very Russian-style. That didn't happen. Yeltsin and his followers defended not individuals, but democracy. This is the most encouraging thing about the "August revolution."

There were more prerequisites for "good luck." Five years of perestroika have changed not only our people by transforming them into courageous and selfless champions of democracy. They have changed the enemies of democracy as well. One can assume in all seriousness, of course, that the coup failed because the Alpha unit had refused to fight. But where did the Beta, Gamma and other units, right through to the Omega, get to? As a matter of fact the conspirators had so many units capable of seizing the Russian parliament building and razing it to the ground that all the alphabets of the world would be short of letters to designate them. Nevertheless, no assault was mounted. This can only be explained by the conspiring politicians and generals having decided against carnage. That was not Bolshevik of them, and that, too, was obviously a result of perestroika in the minds of virtually **all** our compatriots. The conspiracy of the "gang of eight" and its inglorious end have shown that we now live in a new country.



SECRET SERVICES

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Председателям КГБ республик,
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КРЮЧКОВ

Председатель КГБ СССР
генерал армии В. КРЮЧКОВ

Текст шифртелеграммы писать только чернилами в одном экземпляре, четко, слова не сокращать. Черновики подлежат сдаче в шифроорган вместе с написанной шифртелеграммой.

Исполнитель:

The KGB and the coup. A declassified KGB document. Also see p.19

KGB in action

August 19

The KGB chairman signed a coded circular telegram to all the KGB divisions and units and KGB armed force commanders nationwide, saying:

"You will find enclosed herewith the Statement of the Soviet leadership, a decree by the Vice-President of the USSR, Resolution No. 1 by the State Commitee for the State of Emergency in the USSR, the Address to the Soviet people, the Address to the Heads of State and Government, and to the UN Secretary-General of August 18, 1991.

"In accordance with the said documents, you are to take every measure to impose the state of emergency in close interaction with the constitutional government and administrative bodies, prosecution and law-enforcement agencies, and the Armed Forces of the USSR.

"You are to act in keeping with the Law of the USSR On the Legal Regime of the State of Emergency and as called for by circumstances...

V. Kryuchkov,
Chairman of the Committee."

Another coded circular telegram, sent out on the same day, read:

"In connection with the KGB bodies and troops having been put on full alert, please tighten control over the operation of ciphering agencies and rule out the possibility of using the Istok system for information transmission for the purpose of consolidating the forces opposed to the State Commitee for the State of Emergency.

Colonel-General G.Y. Ageyev,
First Deputy Chairman of KGB
of the USSR."

"At this juncture, critical for our society, all the personnel at Russia's state security and law-enforcement agencies must display restraint, prudence, a sober-minded approach to the political situation in the country, offer the authorities, lawfully elected by the people, every cooperation in preventing the use of armed force and subsequent bloodshed. We are certain that the personnel of the KGB and of the Interior Ministry of the Russian Federation will firmly refuse to take part in the anti-constitutional coup.

Major General V. Ivanenko,
Chairman of the State Security
Committee of the Russian
Federation,
V. Barannikov,
Minister of the Interior of the
Russian Federation."

August 20

"To: Commander, task force administration, KGB of the USSR, Moscow; Commander, frontier guard troops of the Transcaucasian Military District, Tbilisi; Commander, 103rd Airborne Division, Vitebsk; Commander, 75th motorized infantry division, Nakhichevan; Commander, 48th motorized infantry division, Chuguyev; Commander, 27th detached motorized infantry brigade.

"From 20 hours, August 20, 1991, 103rd airborne division, 75th motorized infantry division of the frontier troops of KGB of the USSR, 48th motorized infantry division and 27th detached motorized infantry brigade of the task forces of the KGB of the USSR shall be subordinated to the Task Force Administration under the KGB of the USSR. The said Administration is to assume control over the combat operations of the units transferred to it.

V. Kryuchkov,
Chairman of the USSR State
Security Committee"

"To: Chairmen of State Security Committees of the constituent republics; Chiefs of the State Security Administrations of the territories and regions of the Russian Federation;

"On measures to intensify control over the political and operational situation.

"...The State of Emergency Committee (SEC) has worked out and is now putting into effect programmes aimed at an early stabilization of the situation in the USSR...

"Since the SEC has been functioning for less than two days, it would be premature, of course, to expect these programmes to bring immediate results...

"...It follows from the letters, telegrams and phone calls we have received that the overwhelming majority of the working people support the State of Emergency Committee and hope for a stabilization of the situation and an early end to the grave crisis the country is now in.

"At the same time, certain sections of the public voice their misgivings and apprehensions in connection with the imposition of the state of emergency. Unfortunately, the State of Emergency Committee has come up against serious resistance on the part of the top leadership of the Russian Federation. It is distributing appeals, addresses and slogans aimed at provoking a confrontation and procrastinating a political game but containing not a word of concern for the lot of the working people or any suggestions as to ways of getting the country out of the mess it is now in.

"...The leadership of the Russian Federation has put all the national bodies of executive power under the Republic's jurisdiction... Russia's leaders... intend to smash, in violation of the Constitution of the USSR, the national power structures which have taken shape...

"These actions cannot be regarded as legal, of course. The provisions of the above-mentioned Decrees by President of the Russian Federation have no legal force and therefore are not subject to execution. This is to be explained to all the personnel of the armed forces.

"...The state security bodies are to take every measure, under the present circumstances, to ensure an unconditional fulfilment of the SEC's resolutions aimed at getting local situations under control. It is necessary to broaden contacts with the working people to the maximum extent, to lean on the support of the people, of work collectives, of all the healthy forces interested in calm and stability. It is most important to know the problems and needs of the public, to promptly respond to its attitudes, to block attempts to manipulate public opinion...

V. Kryuchkov,
Chairman of the Committee."

August 21

Another coded message to all the local branches of KGB of the USSR:

"The decree by the acting President of the USSR qualifies the decrees by President of the Russian Federation... and the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation... as devoid of legal force, running counter to the Constitution and laws of the USSR, to the proclaimed line of stabilizing the situation in the country, as being openly confrontational and fraught with dangerous consequences. All the government and administrative bodies of the Russian Federation, officials and private individuals have been instructed to strictly comply with the resolutions of the State of Emergency Committee...

V. Kryuchkov,
Chairman of the Committee."

August 22

A coded telegram circulated by the KGB of the USSR to all its branches:

"A coup attempted by a group of high-placed persons on August 19-21 was suppressed as a result of resolute action taken by the country's democratic forces. This anti-constitutional act has not been supported by either the supreme authorities or the people. The conspirators bear full responsibility for their illegal actions.

"...The following circular telegrams are revoked as illegal and invalid from the very start... President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR called upon the personnel of state security bodies to display self-control and vigilance in maintaining law and order in the country.

Colonel-General
V. Grushko,
Deputy Chairman, the KGB
of the USSR."

Dramatis personae:

Vladimir Kryuchkov, ex-Chairman of the KGB of the USSR – arrested.

Geny Ageyev, First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, ex-Secretary of the KGB Party Committee. Relieved of his post.

Victor Grushko, ex-Deputy Chairman of the KGB. Arrested.

Victor Ivanenko, Chairman of the KGB of the Russian Federation.

Victor Barannikov, Minister of the Interior of the Russian Federation, now Minister of the Interior of the USSR.

Genuine democracy should be magnanimous

The exultation which lasts too long has a tendency – not directly visible and therefore even more dangerous – to ruin the fruits of the victory

Ilya Gerol,
Canadian political scientist

People usually like to celebrate good days. During fireworks one finds it easier to join the common cause, whatever it may be. The more since the now defunct communist government had rich experience in organizing a festive atmosphere. Bands played at demonstrations and on other occasions – the anniversaries of the digging of canals and linking of seas, the unification of Polish territories with the Soviet Union and the renaming of their towns, and the inclusion of the Baltic states in the Great Union, without their consent, of course.

The three crucial days in August when a group of putschists who embodied the finest traits of the "guiding Leninist core" – the resoluteness of Lenin, the intellectual poverty of Brezhnev and the clinical insanity of Chernenko – made a wretched attempt to stage a coup will go down in history as the last echo of the memorable volley fired by the cruiser Aurora in October 1917. You probably remember that after the Aurora fired a volley a large crowd of sailors rushed to the Winter Palace in Petrograd and crushed the resistance of the women batallion, the only pillar of the aborted Russian democracy of the February 1917 model.

Incidentally, when some historians took advantage of the short-lived thaw under Khrushchev to establish how many people carried out the October socialist revolution, that is, rushed to the Winter Palace on a rainy October day, they found the published reminiscences of 17,000 people. Another 20,000 people only mentioned their contribution to the storming of the Winter Palace in various books, poems, lectures, and speeches. The artists who drew their pictures in the spirit of socialist realism did not sin against the official truth when, using literary sources, they created triptychs of armed people with happy faces running into history.

Though my apprehensions may be discordant with the present festive mood in Russia and other parts of what is still called the Soviet Union but is not such, I shall nevertheless express them. I am afraid that in several years' time the book market will be inundated with the reminiscences of so many people who kept vigil on the barricades round the Russian parliament building that they will be able to rival in numbers with the mythic participants in the storming of the Winter Palace. This is half the trouble. A worse thing may happen if the distribution of posts depends on a reply to the question: "What were you doing from the 19th to the 22nd of August? I was on the barricades. And what about you?"

An even worse thing may happen if the most correct answer will sound like this: "I could not get to the barricades, but I broke a window in the district party committee building." Fifteen years later in Canada we may have an ambassador from Russia who was appointed to this post mainly because he had thrown a noose on some monument of that damned epoch.

In June 1967, when the small Israeli army routed within six days the troops of several Arab countries which threatened the existence of the Jewish state, the noted philosopher and honorary professor of the Jerusalem University, Leibowitz, said in his radio address to the jubilant crowds of Israelis: "We have defeated the enemy. We have captured vast territories. Now that we have won and justice has triumphed we should return all those territories except Jerusalem, because it is our capital."

The professor's call was brushed aside. Later, the same words were repeated by old David Ben-Gurion, the founder of Israel. His proposal was also brushed aside, though it contained the idea of using the victory for achieving peace with the neighbours.

The victory of Israel has been recorded in textbooks while the territories seized by it have become the main obstacle to a peaceful development of the Jewish state.

The putschists, those stupid top officials, have made a splendid contribution to the final collapse of the communist regime. The traitors deserve punishment envisaged in the law. As the men who suffered a failure and, more, as victims of the monstrous system which they decided to save by their rash action, they should be recommended for mercy. The stronger party confident of itself should always condescend to the weaker and those who went astray.

"The revolution of carnations should not begin with executions," Mario Soares, now President of Portugal, said in April 1974. He was one of the leaders of the revolution against the fascist regime.

I want to believe that the newspaper *Pravda*, which I dislike very much, will soon be published again. Otherwise, going underground, the staff of the newspaper may recall the experience of its first editors among whom were Stalin and Molotov. I can understand, therefore, what the Danish foreign minister told journalists. He said that he was horrified to learn about the banning of Communist parties in the Baltic republics, as if they could not find a wiser expression of their aspirations.

In November 1987 I had the most unpleasant interview in my journalist career. It was not even an interview but a talk unexpectedly cut short.

Two young-looking colonels with pistols under their arms led me into a spacious hall which was in fact an office. In the corner of the huge office stood an imposing table and behind it sat a little man with beautiful shoulder-straps. I began an interview with Augusto Pinochet, then the dictator of Chile. Many years ago the general used tanks and planes against President Salvador Allende, who was a toy in communist hands and brought the nation to economic ruin within a very short time.

"Your excellency," I said after Pinochet



told me how successfully he had restored the economy of Chile and led the nation to democracy, as he, a general, understood it, of course. "Are you going to legalize the Communist Party with the approaching of long-awaited democracy in your country?"

"Never," Pinochet shouted, turning red. He stood up but did not become taller. "I have routed communism in Chile and will never allow it to revive."

"But, your excellency," I remarked timidly, "being driven underground, the Chilean Communist Party has become the largest Marxist party in Latin America. In democratic Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil these parties have almost disappeared after they were legalized."

Pinochet turned round and went out. A minute later the colonels with pistols came into the room and sent me back to Canada. My luggage was brought to the airport.

Bans as an instrument of social life are alien to democracy. During their rather successful development in democratic conditions over many years Western and Asian countries have worked out a system based on the combination of the absolute freedom of expression of views by individuals, parties and associations, and firm and exactly fulfilled laws designed to protect the security of the individual and commercial and productive activity. Such a combination is possible in countries where the ethics of political behaviour are observed and there is a wide network of self-restrictions necessitated by political and social standards.

I shall recall an episode which happened in the Russian parliament after Mikhail Gorbachev had delivered his speech there on returning from his captivity in the Crimea, an episode which is impossible in the parliament of any democratic country. Millions of TV viewers in the West were appalled when a woman member of parliament jumped from her seat and shouted right in the face of the tired President: "We don't need you," and sat down with a triumphant look.

The trampling of losers underfoot and the settling of accounts with them have always been a hallmark of the dictatorship of the proletariat and other public outrages. The politically uneducated rabble is no less dangerous than odious dictators. As distinct from other republics of the disintegrating Union, Russia has today an unprecedented possibility to build a strong, effective, and magnanimous democracy which will not ask its citizens, "What did you do before 1991?" If you did not do anything unlawful your rights and future should not be endangered.

The West is now widely discussing the question of giving the Soviet Union extensive aid in investments, loans, and other ways. This aid will be given only when it becomes clear in what way the community of the Soviet Union's former constituent republics will exist. It is also important to know whether they will be truely democratic republics or whether they will be guided by the ideology of Georgia's current President Gamsakhurdia under which political opponents are regarded as but a medley of criminals.

It is easy to demolish monuments, especially as considerable experience has been gained in this respect. But the legacy of the outgoing epoch consists not of granite monuments. It consists of terrible and evil prejudices based on suspicion, intolerance, cruelty and lack of respect for those who think "differently" from us.

It is possible – and it would be a reasonable step – that Gorbachev will form his own political party and, resigning from his post, will make it a sober and serious force. The elections will show whether his party will win enough votes to form a government or whether it will be in the opposition. Both functions are equally important in democratic society.

OTTAWA

Upon the author's request the fee for this article will be transferred to the fund for the restoration of Moscow after the putsch

"The system couldn't accept the reform without destroying itself"

says Milovan Djilas, Yugoslavia's "dissident number one"

There's no need to introduce Milovan Djilas, not even outside Yugoslavia. At one time the ideologist of the Yugoslav Communist Party, he became its expose and critic. The second man (after Tito) in the post-war leadership argued with the first one and turned into "the main Yugoslav dissident," whose name was until recently mentioned only in a pejorative manner. Today people take his opinion seriously, since many of his forecasts made 40 years ago came true.

Djilas has a "special relationship" with *New Times*. In 1944, several years before he was labeled "the assistant to Tito's fascist clique" he visited Moscow where he wrote an article for our magazine about Tito and his understanding of the bright Communist future in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Forty seven years have elapsed since then and we are talking to Djilas about the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia now that these countries' Communist parties have left the historic arena having failed to build that bright future.

New Times. Yugoslavia is going through a long stage of conflict, which put the country on the verge of collapse. The Soviet Union, too, is believed to be threatened with "Yugoslavization." Is the collapse of multinational states inevitable after the downfall of a Communist regime?

Milovan Djilas. The state system which existed in the Soviet Union until now will be changed. But I wouldn't call it an inevitable collapse. What is inevitable is a new form of community and the separation of the Baltic republics. It would be better for all the other republics to refrain from withdrawing from the Union due to the existing economic ties, especially since the national composition of the population there is not homogeneous. It is most likely that the Soviet Union will be replaced with a weak confederation of states, which at the same time will have stable economic ties.

The main problem in relations between the republics will be that of ethnic minorities. If Russia and other republics are led by strong democratic forces a serious conflict will be avoided. But it takes times, and I am afraid that the Soviet Union will have to go through a period of clashes (including armed clashes) in regions with strong ethnic mixtures.

NT. What could prevent an uncontrolled collapse of multinational states?

M.D. It is too late for both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. A democratic liberal society could rather easily avoid the growth of ethnic conflicts. But in both countries such a society is a thing of the future.

NT. Today Yugoslavia is proving that conflicts and anarchy play into the hands of nationalists and conservatives. Though Communists were removed from government in the name of democracy, democracy has not really been strengthered. Do you agree with this?

M.D. A majority of Yugoslav republics are not very democratic even after the withdrawal of the Communists, and in this respect they are all very much alike. State property prevails and the authorities try to control the mass media. These regimes, though being parliamentarian, have an authoritarian nature. Their parliaments play a minor role and the opposition is very weak in all the republics.

NT. What's the reason for this?

M.D. Democracy has not yet taken root in people's minds. In addition, it still hasn't got a strong basis. In the USSR and Yugoslavia alike the "middle class" – small and middle private owners and a wide stratum of "white collar" workers – is not developed. Although the number of intellectuals in former socialist countries is quite considerable, they were mostly connected with the apparatus. Their creative activity was devoted to supporting the apparatus.

NT. Apparently, the emerging conflicts will complicate the transition to a democratic society?

M.D. Naturaly they will. For instance, Croatia, which is fighting against Serbia is transferring to a military economy. The regime, anti-Communist in its nature, begins to command the economy in the same authoritarian way as the Communists did.

NT. What can prevent a serious conflict in a multinational state? Perhaps, a strong authoritarian personality?

M.D. I'm afraid it's too late both for you and for us. A modern Russian leader of this sort will not be accepted by the non-Russian republics. The president of the USSR will be able to play only the role of a mediator between the republics. The era of the former Gorbachev was over even before the coup, which came as the operetta finale of a stage in society's development.

NT. What in your opinion is the sense of the Soviet Union's transition to the new stage?

M.D. The reform of the Soviet socialist system has proved unrealistic. Restructuring as the liquidation of political remnants of Stalinism has been completed. But the attempt to reform the economic system was doomed. All the reforms in socialist countries failed because they were not completed. And not because their initiators did not want to accomplish them, but because the system couldn't accept such reforms without destroying itself. Therefore, today the people have no money and foreign countries are not too eager to help.

NT. Can foreign assistance save our economies?

M.D. At present the Soviet economy simply cannot effectively accept financial aid. Economic injections would only prolong the life of the former system. You should change the system, and the Soviet Union has enough manpower and material resources.

When Premier Ante Markovic launched a radical reform in Yugoslavia, the economic assistance of the West could have played a positive role. But as soon as the conflict began the chance was lost.

NT. The destruction of the old system is often accompanied by such phenomena as revanchism. What's your attitude to this?

M.D. My attitude to revanchism is strictly negative. For instance I am against banning the Communist party and its newspapers. All bans on political parties and movements (if they are not terrorist) always lead to limiting democracy. And mounting bans always ends in dictatorship.

Today former communists are joining different political movements. Communists-idealists, who believed in the lofty ideal, are mostly becoming staunch democrats. And careerists who used the party as a means of coming to power are usually transformed into nationalists, or pseudo-democrats with the same aim – to remain in power or to come into it.

NT. Communist parties in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are replaced with general democratic movements. What are their chances?

M.D. In Yugoslavia national trends have gotten the upper hand, and there is practically no place for the Union of Reformatory Forces. In the Soviet Union also the Movement for Democratic Reform will find it hard to become a powerful force due to the opposition of the republican nationalists.

Gennady Sysoyev,
NT correspondent
BELGRADE

The planet is concerned with our country's future

"It's a revolution,"

believes Mr. Sumida, head of the international information department in one of the major Japanese newspapers *Sankei Shimbun*.

Sumida, who predicted the events in Tiananmen square in Beijing, repeatedly warned me that similar events should be expected in the USSR.

"The most interesting thing for me," he says, "is that the abortive coup triggered yet another revolution in your country. We couldn't imagine that Soviet society was on the eve of an explosion. And the coup acted as a detonator. In this context one can say that it was a very timely coup."

"And what do you think our country will gain from dismissing the Communist party?"

"Regrettably, for some time all it will gain will be chaos and confusion."

"But why?"

"First of all, because the party apparatus, the KGB, and the militia to some extent guaranteed stability. And so far nobody, not a single existing organization can fill the vacuum. And secondly, it's Yeltsin's behavior and his tactics. He is too aggressive and too hasty. At times he is extremely authoritarian. Of course, a revolution is taking place, and still his line will meet with very strong opposition and not only from conservatives but from liberals, too."

"I am sure we need Gorbachev to balance Yeltsin as a representative of a high political culture. Do you agree?"

"Not quite. If this process is a real revolution, then there must

be only one strong leader. Or several strong leaders in one camp, like Lenin and Trotsky. Then it is all right. But I'm not sure that Yeltsin and Gorbachev are in the same boat. I know that Lenin, Trotsky and other leaders were not entirely of the same mind, but nevertheless, Lenin and Trotsky deeply respected each other. But I'm not at all sure that Yeltsin and Gorbachev feel the same for each other.

"Gorbachev suffers a loss, Yeltsin scores a point. But this is a revolution, and I'm not sure that Yeltsin is safely insured. During a revolution somebody else can spring up all of a sudden, some third figure, as yet unknown. I believe that one always needs to be ready for surprises."

"Don't you think that now after the failure of a 'left-conservative' coup there can emerge a wave of 'right-wing-radical' reaction?"

"The threat of a witch hunt remains. It's the most effective way of mobilizing the angry townspeople and directing their anger against the conservatives. In other words, to deal with the old enemies with the hands of the population. But this is a revolution.

"There are more moderate democrats, such as Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, and Bakatin. They will be able to restrain the excessive passions."

"Now that the reformers have destroyed the conservative camp, we will inevitably witness a split in their own ranks. They will divide into moderates and radicals. And this will take place pretty soon. This is a lesson we've learned from the history of the Russian revolution."

Vladimir Ovsyannikov,
NT correspondent
TOKYO

A lucky strike

"First of all, the last shadows which seemed to revive on that black Monday, have disappeared." That's how Karl Lamers, the chairman of the foreign policy committee in the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag, began our talk. "I mean our old apprehensions. But, thank God, they did not come true. It is very important for the foreign policy situation in Europe.

"The republics will strengthen their positions inside the Union and as a result will play a bigger role in the foreign arena. I believe that there is more of a chance now to build a common European home, where Russia and the Soviet Union will find their places too."

"How will the relations between Bonn and Moscow develop? Will they be privileged as some Western politicians claim?"

"Even if someone is under the impression that Germany is striving for privileged relations with the USSR, it is exactly the opposite impression that we want to create. We would like all the Western nations to pool their efforts to cooperate with the Soviet Union and help it more actively. Our task is to be a locomotive of the world and especially European community."

"Hasn't the West received more opportunities and reasons to demonstrate greater activity in its political relations with the USSR?"

"We can advise and insist, ask and demand, and we want to do this. The victory of the people over the dark forces has created a new situation. It is a lucky strike. Therefore, we want to urge the Soviet leaders to use this chance. Of course, they can answer: 'But you must help us!' And they will be right. And, naturally, the necessary condition for our cooperation remains the implementation of the reforms."

Dmitry Pogorzhelsky,
NT correspondent
BONN

The people have tasted freedom

Due to their attitude towards the developments in the USSR, the present leadership of Romania managed to achieve certain political ends. The president and the government have once again confirmed their resolution to stick to the path of democratic development, the strengthening of a legal state, and respect for human rights. The National Salvation Front has reached mutual understanding with other political forces in the country, since they realize the danger posed by the supporters of the old regime.

The Romanian President Ion Iliescu believes that the events in the Soviet Union must serve as a signal for the international community to build up its support for the countries which have embarked on the path of democratization and are facing economic difficulties inevitable during reforms. In the new political situation in Romania the president again managed to raise the question of ratifying the Soviet-Romanian treaty on cooperation, good-neighbourliness and friendship, which was not well received by the opposition earlier. Ion Iliescu believes this treaty has special meaning, since it establishes relations with the Soviet Union in accordance with the principles which determine international relations.

Viktor Pismarov,
NT correspondent
BUCHAREST

What do the Britons expect?

The first thing the Britons would like to know for sure is what the Soviet Union will be like tomorrow. Experts from the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies predict that in the not too distant future the Union will fall apart into a number of states. According to their forecast, the Baltic republics may form an association, the Slavonic nations will join a confederation, and the Muslims will form a Union in the East. The fact that each of the newly emerged states will possess an army of its own may lead to territorial clashes. Experts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies are drawing a more hopeful picture. They believe that the Union will be replaced with a weak confederation of nine republics which will leave to the centre the tasks of general defence, the forming of fiscal policies, and the organization of the border defence, with the preservation of common currency in a single economic territory.

Nevertheless, the uncertain future of the Soviet Union has not stopped the British premier from stressing the need for radical reductions in Soviet military expenditures as a prerequisite for Western assistance. And though Major said that it "was too early to disregard Gorbachev" as Soviet president he intimated that in addition to Gorbachev Britain would also deal with all the republican leaders.

Britons are also concerned about the uncertain nature of the new relationship between Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev.

And, finally, what will happen to the Soviet Union's foreign debt, if all the republics leave the Union? Will it be equally shouldered by all? Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova and other republics, including Russia, will hardly agree to this.

Britain has already witnessed the collapse of its own Empire, and it knows that this process should be guided. This is the only way to a Commonwealth.

Sergei Babusenko,
NT correspondent
LONDON

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"Ossies" and "Wessies"

Real reunification is still ahead

Boris Lysenko

Since the reunification of Germany Berlin has witnessed quite a few changes. Former blind alleys have become through streets joining the Eastern and Western parts of the city into a single whole. (One of such ex-blind alleys is Leipziger Straße, where the *New Times* office is situated). In Berlin sreets are being repaired, main thoroughfares renewed, the façades of buildings restored, and new comfortable hotels built. Renewed shop windows are overflowing with West German goods: summer sales are going on.

For many years East Germans could see such an abundance of commodities only on TV screens. The citizens of the former German Democratic Republic did not give much thought to the stages of economic and social development through which West Germany had to progress (the Marshall plan and the economic reform of Chancellor Erhard) to reach today's prosperity. Many people in East Germany thought that they would automatically enjoy a high standard of living. But life is not a TV show.

The Berlin Wall is no more, but separation remains

The Berlin Wall will forever remain in the minds of the Germans as a symbol of their national split. In the excitement of reunion no one could imagine that the concrete wall was nothing compared with other "walls": psychological, economic, and social...

So far many East Germans are bewildered, perplexed, and discontented.

A year ago more than 90 percent of East Germans and 80 per cent of West Germans came out in favour of reunion. Today one out of every three East Germans would prefer being "back" in the GDR. As many as 77 percent of young East Germans do not like their Western fellow citizens. "Ossiers" and "Wessies," as the inhabitants of the Eastern and Western parts of Germany are commonly called, are not very friendly to one another. Why? The wages and salaries of East Germans are, on the average, a third lower than those of their colleagues in West Germany. In many cases the years of work in the GDR are not taken into account when pensions are fixed. The certificates of degree given in former East Germany are not recognized as valid, either. Meanwhile, 80 percent of West German citizens think that "Ossies" want to get everything without working for it.

In a nutshell, 80 percent of East Germans feel themselves to be second-rate citizens in their own reunited country. Most of the "Wessies" believe that the growing expenditures brought about by the reunification of Germany are unwarranted. On the basis of that poll *Der Spiegel* has drawn the following conclusion: the "Ossies" and the "Wessies" are not one, but rather different peoples.

From social equality to social justice

The East Germans' way of thinking has started changing, none the less. How much time is required for the principle of social justice to oust the principle of social equality from people's minds?

In the meantime, the main link of the former GDR, the economy, is suffering greatly from the "capitalist" principle of social justice. It is commonly known that the national economy of the GDR held a leading position in the community of socialist countries. But it is markedly behind the private-enterprise economy of West Germany. Proceeding from this premise, the federal government has placed the entire state property of East Germany at the disposal of the trusteeship department. This department deals with denationalization of state property, or privatization. Factories, plants, mines, pits, land and housing are sold. That which does not find a market is done away with.

The tough activities of the trus-

The future of all former state property in East Germany and to a large extent the destiny of its residents depends now on Birgit Breuel, president of the trusteeship department

Photo from International Herald Tribune

Boris Lysenko, Cand.Sc. (Hist.) has taken up his post as the *New Times* correspondent in Berlin. He was born in 1941. From 1974 to 1979 he was the Berlin correspondent for *New Times*. After that he worked at the newspaper *Izvestia*. Now he is back with *New Times* in Berlin

teeship department have already had tangtible results. In conformity with the Bonn programme of developing East Germany, more than 100,000 million marks will be invested in its economy this year. Foreign investments are also expected. Chancellor Helmut Kohl assured the "Ossies" of the effectiveness of that aid: "Within three to five years we shall achieve our main goal: national unity will be enhanced with economic, social, and ecological unity."

The federal authorities are not "patching up" the economy of the former GDR. They are rebuilding it from bottom up, on the basis of up-to-date technology, and encouraging the expansion of Western giants who have bought up the largest trading centres and have flooded the extensive East German market with a tremendous quantity of West German consumer goods and foodstuffs.

The inhabitants of the former GDR cannot stand market competition and rather adversely react to it. Social conflicts, even the most acute ones, may take place.

Along the lines of privatization

Problems of property ownership have become a point of conflict between East and West Germans. Close to 1,000,000 possessory actions on land, houses, and other realties have been brought to court. Their consideration may last many years. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of people are fearing of confiscation. It is hard to imagine the political consequences if the land reform carried out in the Soviet zone of occupation during the initial postwar years were cancelled. Such an attempt was made. The question was examined in the Federal Constitutional Court. The Court wisely decided that the land reform was not at variance with the main law of the country and was not subject to repeal. Only compensation was guaranteed to former landowners.

All land belonging to the Party of Democratic Socialism (Communists) has been placed under the control of the trusteeship department. The bank accounts of the Party have been frozen and currency transactions have been suspended. The trusteeship department is going to establish complete financial control over the Party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* as well.

The future of state property, estimated at 600,000 million marks last summer, is also in the hands of the trusteeship department. This department has extremely wide powers: it can practically single-handedly adopt decisions on the denationalization, modernization, or dissolution of unprofitable enterprises.

A little more than 600 enterprises have been denationalized so far. The process has been slowed not by negligence or lack of skill, but by a number of unresolved problems.

The first of them is legal problems of property ownership. According to the treaty on Germany's unification, it is prohibited to sell or lease enterprises or plots of land if their former owners or heirs show up. Courts have some 1,000,000 complaints from people who want to recover their immovable property. As long as these cases remain unsettled, foreign investors will not risk their capital.

The second problem is the tremendous, 110,000-million debt of the enterprises which belonged to the former GDR. They are to pay old debts. Of course, potential buyers are not going to accept the promissory notes of ex-owners.

The third problem is that two thirds of people's enterprises cannot be transferred to the private sector because of their noncompetitiveness. They should first be modernized, taking into consideration the requirements of the market economy. Substantial investments are needed for this.

The denationalization of the state sector is a complicated and cruel process. It is accompanied by skyrocketing unemployment in East Germany. In the opinion of experts, by the end of the year the former GDR may have 4,000,000 unemployed.

Rapprochement

The main political parties of the FRG differ in their assessment of the trusteeship department. The Christian Democrats assign primary importance to denationalization. The Social Democrats, in opposition, insist on aid to unprofitable enterprises.

The anxiety of the Social Democratic Party of Germany is well grounded, as the reunification of Germany has witnessed quite a number of problems. Government food and clothes subsidies have been cancelled. Tariffs for fuel and electricity, postage and fares have increased several times. Rent has gone up 3 to 5 times.

At the recent Bundestag session the ruling coalition parties managed to pass a package of bills on higher taxes. Now all German citizens, in the East and the West, will pay 7.5 percent more to the treasury than before. The government has called this additional fund a "solidarity action." The Social Democratic Party of Germany and other opposition parties regard it as plundering the population of former East Germany whose incomes are three times lower than those of West Germans.

For all that, each political party of Germany, amidst the heated discussions of concrete and strategic problems, is trying to make its contribution to the prompt development of the five new lands in the East, without which Germany's entire economic well-being could be in jeopardy.

The Germans in the East and the West of their country have been going through hard times. Reunited, they still are not one. The complicated but apparently inevitable process of getting used to one another and of becoming reconciled has been taking place.

BERLIN

Budapest

The Budapest tragedy of 1956 was infamous the world over. Only in the Soviet Union is the truth about it still kept in special archives. The Hungarian President continues his story about those days

Arpad Göncz

On October 30, a group of people united by common goals gathered in Imre Nagy's office in the parliament building to consider the terms of the ceasefire. Most of them were former members of the Resistance like Angyal Istvan, a Communist who led a group of rebels in the Tüzolto Street (executed in 1957). A secretary came in and passed a note to the prime minister. Imre Nagy read it and looked up at us. "From now on, gentlemen, we must conduct negotiations in a different way," he said. "A third world war can start in the Middle East at any moment." On the same day we received other news. The evacuation of Soviet troops through our eastern border with the USSR had been discontinued and more Soviet units had begun to move to Hungary.

October 31. British planes bombed Cairo, and French and British troops launched military operations in Egypt. The Soviet government declared that it was prepared to enter into negotiations with Budapest and other Warsaw Treaty states on the presence of its troops in Hungary. Donor blood, medicines, dressing, food and window-panes arrived in Budapest from all parts of the country and from abroad. The work of the municipal transport was gradually returning to normal.

November 1. Imre Nagy, who had assumed the duties of foreign minister, made a statement to Yuri Andropov, then Soviet ambassador to Hungary. It became known from reliable sources, he said, that more Soviet troops had been moved into Hungary. The prime minister called for an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops and declared Hungary's intention to leave the Warsaw Pact and proclaim neutrality. For this purpose, he added, Budapest asked the four great powers and the United Nations to provide guarantees to this effect. The entire world celebrated the victory of the Hungarian revolution. Fighting continued in the Middle East.

Life in Budapest was returning to normal. A group of rebels from the Corvin Lane, perhaps the strongest in the capital, published an appeal. "We young fighters for freedom have struggled, not talked, till now," it said. "We have decided to break our silence to appeal to our Hungarian brothers: restore and maintain public order as soon as possible. Don't give the Russians an excuse to remain in our country. Today it is the most important, paramount national task. Those who violate public order betray the homeland."

The worker councils of large enterprises decided to resume their work. The worker council of Csepel, the largest plant in the country, declared: "We are not going to turn our plant over to capitalists, for it has become our plant in deed, not in words. And since it is so, it would be more reasonable to use our property effectively."

Meanwhile, Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov were holding talks with Polish leaders on the border between their countries about the invasion of Hungary by Soviet troops. In the evening of November 1, Janos Kadar, the newly elected General Secretary of the Party, delivered a speech. He said, in particular: "The glorious uprising of our people has overthrown the Rakosi

For the first instalment see *NT* No.35

1956

dictatorship and restored the power of the people and the independence of the country." After that Kadar disappeared from Budapest and for the next two days the party leadership had no contact with him. Under the pretext of sending the wounded and relatives of servicemen home, Soviet tanks surrounded Hungarian airfields. The government forbade the Hungarian armed forces to clash with Soviet troops.

November 2. Firing ceased all over the country. A renewed Communist Party was formed. It was called the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. "The Hungarian Jews enthusiastically welcome the revolution which has restored their freedom to profess their religion. Eternal glory to the fallen heroes. We feel united with our free and independent homeland," the Jewish religious organizations declared in their statement. In the afternoon, railway traffic was restored. The worker council of the Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen, the main industrial area of Hungary, declared: "We shall not give the land back to landowners, the plants to capitalists, the mines to their former owners, and the leadership of the army to Horthy generals." The writers' union organized fund raising in support of the relatives of those who were killed in fighting. Open boxes not guarded by anyone were put up in the squares of Budapest, and a huge sum was collected within a few hours.

Forty-two air raids were made against Cairo within 24 hours. Secretary of State Dulles said the United Nations should discuss Hungary's statement about its intention to proclaim neutrality. The Hungarian government appointed a delegation for talks on the pullout of Soviet troops and also urged the Soviet government to discuss without delay the question of Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. The government simultaneously protested against the movement of Soviet troops and appealed to the United Nations with the request to recognize Hungary's neutrality and urge the Soviet and Hungarian governments to enter into negotiations at once.

Khrushchev and Malenkov met in Bucharest with leaders of Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia to discuss preparations for the military occupation of Hungary. After that they went to Brijoni in order to secure Tito's support. The United Nations set the hearing of the Hungarian question for November 3.

November 3. Imre Nagy formed a new government. Most of its ministers were representatives of the former parties of the government coalition. The Csepel worker council and the Ujpest revolutionary committee called for ending the strike. Negotiations between the two government delegations began in the headquarters of Soviet troops in Hungary. During the talks General Serov, then head of the KGB, arrested the members of the Hungarian delegation. The Soviet delegate to the UN Security Council denied that more Soviet troops had been moved into Hungary. Budapest replaced its representative in the United Nations who did not fulfil the government's instruction to get the Hungarian question included on the Security Council's agenda. The Hungarian foreign ministry admitted that Hungary's UN representative Peter Koos was in fact a Soviet citizen, Lev Konduktorov, whose name had been changed with the consent of the

former leaders of the ministry. New reports on the movement of Soviet troops were received. It was reported from Vienna that Soviet units had closed the Hungarian-Austrian border.

Yuri Andropov, Soviet ambassador to Hungary

General Pavel Batov, commander of the punitive operations

The end was nearing. Early in the morning of **November 4,** Tito and Rankovic, acting on behalf of the Yugoslav government, offered asylum to Imre Nagy and other persons of his choosing. At four o'clock in the morning, Soviet troops moved towards Budapest. At 5:20 a.m., Imre Nagy announced the news over the radio. At the same time the radio station of Szolnok, a town in the south of Hungary, announced the formation of a government by Kadar. Imre Nagy and 43 of his colleagues accepted the refuge offered by the Yugoslav government. Minister of State Istvan Bibo declared in parliament on behalf of the government: "Hungary has no intention to pursue an anti-Soviet policy. Moreover, it seeks to live in peace with those East European countries which are building their life in a just and free society free from exploitation. Before the entire world I would like to refute the lie that the glorious Hungarian revolution was marred by manifestations of fascism and anti-Semitism. The entire Hungarian people, irrespective of their class and religious distinctions, took part in fighting, and their humaneness and wisdom were startling. I call on the Hungarian people not to recognize the occupation army or the puppet government being formed by it as supreme lawful power. I call on everyone to show civil disobedience (with the exception of those who supply Budapest with food and other goods). It is not possible for me to give an order for armed resistance, because I became a member of the govenrment only yesterday and do not know the military situation. It would therefore be irresponsible on my part to call on the Hungarian youths to shed their blood." There were many points of spontaneous armed resistance to Soviet troops.

The government formed by Kadar in Szolnok asked the UN Security Council to delete the Hungarian question from the agenda. The Hungarian Writers' Union made an appeal to the writers, academicians, scientists and prominent intellectuals of the world: "Time is fleeting. You know the facts, so there is no need to remind you of them. Help Hungary! Help the Hungarian people! Help the Hungarian writers, scientists, workers, peasants and intellectuals! Help, help, help!"

A state security official executed in Budapest in 1956

The revolutionary military council of Dunapentele (former Sztalinvaros), a city with a predominantly working-class population, made the following appeal over the radio: "Those who can handle artillery guns are urgently requested to come to the Bartok community centre. Doctors, hospital attendants and other medical personnel must return as soon as possible to their hospitals."

Another report was broadcast in the afternoon. "We shall, probably, stop broadcasting very soon," it said. "But we shall do that only when we are killed. We are the last free radio station. Today, at 3:30 in the morning, Soviet troops launched an offensive against the Hungarian army. We do not know when we shall be killed." Another provincial radio station appealed to the United Nations. "We appeal to you as our last hope. Save our country from destruction and slavery," it said.

November 5. The Kadar government, which called itself a revolutionary worker-peasant government, appealed to socialist countries for assistance in restoring public order.

November 6. Some 160 people were killed in the fighting in Budapest. Istvan Bibo proposed a compromise plan for a settlement of the Hungarian question.

November 7. The Kadar government arrived in Budapest. The re-

Cardinal Mindszenty – free at last

volutionary committees were stripped of their powers. Four Soviet combat planes strafed the rebels in the southern part of Budapest. The journalists went on strike.

November 8. New worker councils were formed one after another.

November 9. Some 110 people more were killed in the fighting. The first, "bloody," period of the revolution was nearing its end. During several days, Soviet troops, acting skillfully and methodically against the desperate but disorganized and weaker enemy, suppressed the Hungarian revolution. The vacuum formed in Europe after the Hungarian revolution and the Anglo-Franco-Israeli attack on Egypt was filled. The Stalinist leaders of the East European countries were saved from the flames of revolutionary events.

The revolution triggered a wave of strikes, political resistance of worker councils, and futile diplomatic attempts to reach a reasonable compromise. The most important of these attempts was a proposal from the Hungarian democratic movement for independence which united all political organizations of the country. On December 5, 1956, in Budapest it was delivered to Krishna Menon, the Indian ambassador in Moscow and a personal envoy of Nehru, for passing it on to the Soviet government. The preamble and the first point of the document said, "We the undersigned (the Smallholders' Party, Revolutionary Council of Intellectuals, Social Democratic Party, Petöfi Party, Budapest Worker Council, and Hungarian Peasant Union – **Ed.**), try to do everything in our power to defend the independence of our country and the results achieved in the building of socialism:

– ensure fraternal and creative cooperation of Hungary with the Soviet people and the countries of the socialist camp;

– establish and promote cultural ties with all peoples of the world;

– fulfil, in keeping with the UN Charter, all commitments arising from Hungary's membership in the United Nations, and exercise all rights granted by the world community.

"Guided by the given desire, the undersigned, on their behalf and on behalf of the political parties and mass organizations led by them, solemnly declare that in their political life they intend to adhere to the following principles:

"1. The foundation of the social and economic system of Hungary is public ownership of the greater part of the means of production. In the interests of ensuring the proportional growth of the productive forces, increasing national income, augmenting property and steadily raising the material well-being and cultural standards of the people, Hungary needs a planned and democratic management of the economy that will not fetter economic life and progress."

Having stated the basic economic and constitutional principles as a counterbalance to the Kadar government's position, we stated further in our document: "The experience of the past few weeks shows that the Soviet government's statement about its intention to start negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country and the normalization of Hungarian-Soviet relations only after public order has been fully restored is not sufficient for strengthening the Hungarian government's position, restoring public order and creating an atmosphere vital for reconstruction and production processes. Every sober-minded Hungarian clearly realizes the vital importance of relations with the Soviet Union. However, it would be misleading to assert that the sentiments created by the presence of Soviet troops are favourable for the maintenance of friendly ties between the two countries, because it creates the impression that the Hungarians can be kept in the socialist camp only by force. With such public sentiments it is impossible to strengthen public order and restore the normal character of production. Thus, the condition on which the Soviet Union bases the withdrawal of its troops is impracticable by virtue of their presence in our country."

No reply was given to this proposal, and harsh repressions began. At first, with the help of promises to let them go home, Imre Nagy and his colleagues were enticed from the Yugoslav embassy and then sent with their families to Romania. After a trial in Hungary, the prime minister, who did not give up his post, and his four colleagues were executed. Some 13,000 people, including heads and members of worker councils, were brought to trial on charges of committing crimes. About 300 were hanged and buried in common graves. No one knows exactly how many people were annihilated. Around 200,000 people, mainly those of younger generations, emigrated to the West.

In May 1957, the author of these reminiscences was put on trial along with Istvan Bibo, the author of the above-mentioned appeal, an eminent political thinker, and the most decent Hungarian politician of the 20th century. We had been charged with drawing up and broadcasting this appeal, helping the relatives of arrested people, smuggling out and publishing abroad Imre Nagy's book, *The Hungarian People Defend Themselves,* "directing the activity to undermine the state system of the Hungarian People's Republic," and "conspiring with foreign states to undermine the state system of the Hungarian People's Republic." At a secret trial without a freely chosen lawyer and right of appeal, I was sentenced to life imprisonment. I spent over six years in prison.

So "public order was restored" in Hungary. The dream of building a law-governed state, cherished by our people for one and a half centuries, was buried for another 30 years. The Hungarians kept silent for 31 years, but they forgot nothing. On June 16, 1989, some 300,000 people came to the Heroes' Square to honour the memory of Imre Nagy and his four colleagues, to honour the memory of the prime minister, a Communist, who remained loyal to the revolution to his last day, to honour the memory of hundreds of victims of repressions buried in common graves.

It seemed to me that the funeral ceremony was attended by the crews of two Soviet tanks who, during a clash in front of the parliament building, opened fire not on the crowd, but on murderers who were hiding in a garret, and by soldiers of the Soviet garrison in Györ who fraternized with Hungarians. It seemed that, laying flowers at the symbolic coffin of nameless heroes, people also honoured the memory of thousands of nameless Soviet soldiers, who, obeying the order and their oath, fought against the rebels and became innocent victims of the tragic but ignominious cause.

I believe that such times have passed never to return, because the present Soviet Union and the present Hungary are jointly fighting against the bloody shadow of Stalinist arbitrary rule in a spiritual alliance stronger than any paper agreement.

Photos from Der Spiegel (Germany)

ЗАТМЕНИЕ МАРКСА

About the history of the great October socialist catastrophy

"Doubt everything," Marx used to say. In this contribution to be published in 5 or 6 instalments, the omnipotent and true theory of Marx is questioned.



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

A spectre haunts the Union

Simon Soloveichik



WHAT IS HAPPENING? A spectre is haunting the Soviet Union, the spectre of capitalism. All forces of the old order are uniting to track down this spectre. And all are so afraid of it that they refer to it with euphemisms, as one does the devil. When it first appeared, they called it NEP (New Economic Policy). The second time, now, they call it the market, and of all the synonyms for capitalism the word "market" is the worst, because people see the market as a place where one tries to swindle others.

If they are afraid of the word, what about the phenomenon itself? The fear of the revival of capitalism has been built into the genetic code of the people, because for many decades even thinking about capitalism was sin number one. It was traced and mercilessly punished either by death or imprisonment. But since it is difficult to monitor mere thoughts, general roundups were made: if you arrest thousands of people, chances are good that at least one of them is dreaming about capitalism and you can get rid of him. And completely innocent people were not to blame if they were the unlucky ones to be rounded up, and read the standard accusation: "Attempted to revive capitalism through terrorism and sabotage." (V. Mukhina-Petrinskaya, *On the Palm of Fate*, Saratov, 1990).

We were taught to think that anyone who dreamed about the revival of capitalism was a terrorist, saboteur and spy. The state rested on a firm foundation: the people had spilled blood to be free, had thrown off the yoke of the exploiters, and were building a bright future under the guidance of their own (that's a very important phrase – their own) party. They were building socialism and communism. Anyone against it was the enemy, and not of the party, nor of the leaders or of the system, but of people. And they would be dealt with through the anger of the people. Revival of capitalism was literally unthinkable: it was impossible to think about it and practically no one did. The very boldest critics accused the government of departing from the idea of socialism, distorting it. Socialism was beyond suspicion, it was perceived as the strict theory developed by the founders of Marxism and thus infallible.



The following happened to the author of the book the above-mentioned quote was taken from: 20 years after being freed, Valentina Mukhina-Petrinskaya (she told me herself) was unexpectedly summoned to Moscow to the military procurator's office. They said: "Here is your file. From it we see that at the interrogations you refused to sign for a long time, but later you signed. Why? Did they torture you?"

They tortured her terribly. At that time she was a young Komsomol journalist and didn't want the revival of capitalism at all.

No, she said. Nothing of the kind happened. No one touched her.

They explained to her that her sadistic investigator had been arrested and was in prison. But of his victims only two were still alive and the second would tell how he was beaten. Her testimony was needed too.

"Me testify against my own investigator?" Valentina Mukhina-Petrinskaya was surprised.

One of the men in the procurator's office laughed.

"I've never heard the words 'my own' used in such a situation," he said.

And socialism, no matter how excruciating it has been, for many people is their own and therefore there cannot be any capitalism or its revival. Why, you'll probably accuse me of terror and sabotage next. We just have a market, a mixed economy, an integration into the world system, a return to world civilization, a deideologization of the economy...

But not speaking frankly provides an opportunity to expose the crafty advocates of the market, lead them out into the open, get them for duplicity. Why not speak honestly!

The more they try to cover something up, the more it smells of criminality. Everyone knows: capitalism means robbing the people, social stratification, unemployment, the transfer of public property to a bunch of greedy sharks... That is what those on top right now want

to bring the people to – "they go on like they did, a conveyor on the TV screen, like purple frozen hunks of beef in refrigeration with an inked stamp on the democratic haunch," writes the newspaper of the Writers' Union of the USSR, *Denj* (Day).

War! A holy war against the spectre of capitalism, against the threat hanging over our people, from whom they want to take their hard won socialism.

WHAT IS HAPPENING? Before our very eyes ideological arguments are being turned into jihad, a holy war. They shout from the tribune, from the pages of newspapers: "Capitalism is being revived!" They want to change the social order without asking the people first.

Their main argument is as follows: is it reasonable that the public property created by the sweat and blood of millions be taken away from the people even if it is with the help of deputies chosen by them? (Letter in *Moskovskaya Pravda).*

No, it is not reasonable.

It isn't important that this property never belonged to the people. Indignation doesn't need logic. When the point of contention is the sweat and blood of millions, does logic have a place? Here people are always counted in millions. All speak for the millions, and if for less than a million, no one will intercede.

So, did the millions who gave their lives for the people, for rule by the people, for public property die in vain? No, you say straight away. Socialism is my life. Isn't my life worth something?

Seventy years we've had socialism, they say. Either we didn't build it, or we built something else. So have we lived in vain?

We seethe with indignation. We can't cope with such disappointment. It's enough to drive one crazy.

After all, many people prided themselves on having played some part in the great construction of socialism. Freud called such a complex a "narcissistic self-satisfaction with one's own ideal." The ideal compensates for one's humble position in society. "I may be a pitiful, indebted plebeian and have a military obligation, but I'm a Roman."

Only such self-satisfaction, writes Freud, can explain "why so many cultures, in spite of the just hostility of the majority of people to them, held out for so long."

WHAT IS HAPPENING? Sanctification. Since everyone who has any sense at all sees what socialism has led to, the only way left to defend it is sanctification, i.e., turning the shaky ideas of socialism into holy truths.

Every conscience, at different depths, has a threshold of holiness, and any, even the most stupid idea, having crossed this threshold, turns into an irrefutable value, into something holy, and hides in it as an escaped prisoner hides from the law in a church. Having become holy, the idea petrifies and people calm down – doubts no longer torment them.

Having hidden in the temple of holiness, the idea is more inaccessible to the application of reason, the competition of other ideas and the contradiction of facts – it's no longer an idea, but a faith. It's impossible to refute, because it is already irrefutable. Its irrefutability is its main quality. And if anyone speaks out against it, they say about him: "Nothing is sacred for him." Only what I hold holy is holy. Religions tolerate other religions, but false religions do not tolerate pluralism.

After the idea of socialism became a false religion, not even a real failure could topple it. It could easily sidestep such a reproach as "Just look what's happening around you." In an extreme situation they say: "Can socialism be built in 70 years? And out of that time you should remember there were two wars, two reconstruction periods, and the personality cult. So what time was there? Capitalism has been developing for centuries, while socialism is just getting under way. Of course, in such a short historical time span it could not fully show its advantages. And now the rush with *perestroika."*

One prominent professor of economics speaking everywhere in all earnestness swears that if there had not been *perestroika,* each family today would own a car. And he cites figures.

WHAT IS HAPPENING? They write that if a referendum were conducted today, 60 percent of the population would vote for socialism.

We won't argue with the accuracy of that figure. Even without any polling or referendums it is clear that many fear capitalism, even if it is masked by the word "market."

Here everything comes together: the fear of high prices and losing one's job, and the psychology of pariahs not wanting to rise up from the social depths, no matter how they envy the well-off people and countries. It is beggers' fear of life and their reasoning is: "Just so it won't be any worse."

It is the fear of those who have lived off what they have stolen. They fear their opportunities will dry up, that they'll lose their connections. With them it's simply the lack of desire and inability to work hard. Socialism makes people lazy. This has been proven by the Germans, who were divided into East and West: one national character, one culture; but now, after reuniting, the West Germans reproach the former citizens of socialist East Germany of being lazy, not having any initiative, and fearing responsibility. Socialism spoiled even people noted for order and being industrious.

And on that endless list is the habit of totalitarianism – fear of the necessity to have to make choices at each step, fear of the possibilities that freedom gives, i.e., the fear of freedom so well studied by sociologists, a flight from freedom. Finally, the people have been brought up for decades to hate the rich and envy anyone who lives on income not earned. The envy is due to not liking one's own hard work – for to work under socialism means to bend your back and not spare yourself. And this has become a very hot issue today. Have we bent our backs for 70 years for socialism, and now we'll slave away for private owners? A bent back has long been a socialist term. You can find it in Marx: "The labourer pays in persona, and this is one of the mysteries of the self-preservation of capital..."

IS GOING ON
WHAT
WILL BE



All these complex fears, prejudices, doubts, attachments, and habits combine and are covered by one word, "socialism," which now isn't a theory at all, as it was at one time, but a symbol, a sacred cover allowing the base fears to be covered up and presented as the noble fight for social justice in the interests of the people.

In a word, "one's own" socialism, just like one's own investigator.

WHAT IS HAPPENING? MARX IS ALWAYS RIGHT. And there is even confusion at the theoretical level. It's impossible not to see the obvious, but no one wants to abruptly part with the ideas they've become accustomed to, to admit their flimsiness. I won't quote the attacks of the most vicious newspapers. With them everything is clear. But even in the main democratic publications you can find the thought, "What a good idea they ruined!" Right in the cartoons in many papers, Marx, Engels and Lenin sit glumly and sigh: "It was a good idea!"

In the magazine *Yunost*, in the discussion section, they write: "I don't agree that if communism led to a tragedy, the theory is all wrong. Any scholar knows the correctness of a theory cannot always be measured by an experiment. The results do not really tell you anything. No matter what communism led to in practice, the great inspiration of the philosophical idea as a world outlook remains..."

The experiment was a failure, but the theory remained a great inspiration. Perhaps it should be tried again?

They write that the obvious difference between the results and the theory shouldn't necessarily be seen as a defect, for the economy of the Western countries these days is very different from the capitalism of Marx's day. "Mainly these changes, not the flaws in the theory, have brought about the difficulty in realizing it (the *Communist* monthly, No. 10).

So the difficulty is that the world has changed. But the idea was good!

It turns out (maybe even against the wishes of the author) that in his time Marx was right about everything. There were no flaws in his theory. And that means the people were right who set up a dictatorship according to the concepts of their time.

And so the conclusion is roughly that Marx created an ingenius theory, but we couldn't correctly use it.

Literally before our eyes the idea of a second coming is formed and strengthened, and there is no rejecting socialism this time. But it does need to be radically changed, corrected, and rid of alien features imposed on it. Back into battle! Up with the Soviets. We still haven't fought to the last man. The situation is similar to the one before the signing of the miserable Brest Peace Agreement: consenting to everything just to stay in power. What? A market? Okay, we'll agree to a market and to competition. We'll agree to anything, just hook up our car with socialism to each train. Don't leave us. You can change the direction, but don't change the sign. Let it be a socialist market, socialist competition, a socialist entrepreneur, socialist unemployment, socialist bankruptcy. The concept of "socialist capitalism" has yet to come. I think it will appear soon.

The theory of the second coming – the only remaining basis of a special role for the Communist Party, its right to all the property, to the covert management of the whole economy since it long ago merged with the government, and to indivisible rule. For it is absolutely clear that there is no one to build socialism number two except the Communist Party. How could it be done without the party? How could there have been a call for departification?

Socialism became sacred because it, for different reasons, is needed by various real forces and because it is a basic concept for the development of culture having predominated in our society for decades. And a culture always has the instinct of self-preservation. Experts think that the changes in a culture, which one way or another takes place in a wide strata, are just as necessary as economic changes. Without them there can be no new economy.

But culture won't change if the word "socialism" will, as before, either consciously or subconsciously, be seen as good, as defending the workers, as public property and the like. The poor results of the socialist construction don't in the least daunt those who would refurbish socialism, and they don't always admit that they are poor: they industrialized the country, created atomic weapons and, most importantly, were the victors in World War II. That means, of course, that socialism won. If anyone asks who won in 1812, it's considered a provocation.

Well, let's try to get to the theoretical sources of the sacred socialist idea which, as we see, is so potent. Let's try to get to the logical core of it and see what's there.

We must, it seems to me, not go into the details, particulars, forms, but the essence. If there is anything rational about socialism, then the theory of the second coming is probably true. It is right and should be supported. If there isn't, then the advocates of socialism will have to pose the great, though not understood by everyone, danger. They are again forcing the country down a fatal road.

On the other hand, if the socialist idea is pure deceit, if it was only speculation, a foreign idea, an invader and occupier, as they sometimes write now, then it's not clear how it won so many minds and hearts, why one way or another it was accepted by those very same millions who would later die either for it or because of it.

But if there is nothing fundamentally wrong with it, why then have all attempts to create a society without private property and capitalism failed? If it had just succeeded somewhere!

Where is that point at which socialism from its very conception combined attraction with falsehood?

People wanted to live better, sought the road – a railroad into a golden century...

Was Gestapo chief Müller a Soviet spy?

The memoirs of the former chief of the German intelligence service, Walter Schellenberg, were published only after his sudden and mysterious death. Schellenberg not only revealed some of the Third Reich's secrets and portrayed Nazi bosses, but also raised questions that continue to baffle historians. *New Times* offers excerpts from Walter Schellenberg's reminiscences

The relations between Reichsführer of Waffen SS, Himmler, and head of the NSDAP Chancellery, Bormann, soured in the summer of 1942. Their mutual dislike kept growing. This was so primarily because they were vying to be the Führer's main favourite. The opposition of the two powerful and formidable adversaries made me think of the following picture: where Bormann behaved as a ferocious boar in a potato field, Himmler acted like a crane in a lettuce patch: the Reichsführer was very cautious and at times it seemed that he did not want to remove his adversary. It must be added that Himmler kept making tactical errors, even grave errors, which Bormann was always ready to take advantage of. Once the Reichsleiter (The supreme post in the NSDAP hierarchy occupied by Martin Bormann. – **Ed.**) received a dangerous trump card which could be played against the Reichsführer: he got information that Himmler had tried to bribe and recruit some officials in the NSDAP Chancellery which was under the Reichsleiter's control.

Despite the complicated relations with Bormann, my boss tried to be tactful with him. Once the Reichsführer and I discussed how we should act to weaken the influence of the NSDAP Chancellery, head. Himmler pointed out that the Füerer was so used to Bormann and his style of work, that Bormann's influence would be hard to undermine.

"That is why," the Reichsführer said, "I have to make deals with Bormann all the time, to compromise will him, although I have some serious reasons to insist on his resignation. For example, I believe that Bormann fully shares the responsibility for some of Hitler's wrong decisions."

Later I asked myself what the original reason was for Bormann's colossal power. He started his climb to the top as a modest estate manager in run-of-the-mill Mecklenburg. His appearance was nothing special: He was a heavyset, broad shouldered type with a bovine back of the head. His head was always thrust forward, as if he kept resisting the contraction of his cervical muscles. Whenever I looked at him, I thought of a boxer who was watching his opponent, his left shoulder turned forward, preparing to charge.

Naturally, the political past of the former agronomist had played a significant role in Bormann's having a great amount of influence of Hitler. Bormann used to serve in the Black Reichwehr. (According to the Treaty of Versailles Germany was allowed by thye winning powers to have its own army – the Reichswehr, with a strength of up to 100,000 men. The German government formed an illegal army, the Black Reichwehr, in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles. – **Ed.**) Bormann fought the French as a saboteur in Ruhr after the French troops occupied the German province following Germany's defeat in the First World War. After that he was one of the first to join the Nazi party and started a gradual climb to the top using the support of Rudolf Hess (Hitler's deputy in the Nazi Party who was parachuted to Britain in May 1941. He was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Nuremberg Tribunal, and committed suicide in prison. – **Ed.**) Like Heydrich (SS-Obergruppenführer, head of the Reich Security Head Office and deputy Imperial Protector for Bohemia and Moravia who was assasinated in June 1942. – **Ed.**), Bormann set up his own personnel department – an original intelligence department which cooperated with the Internal Security department. Bormann's personnel department contained files on any state, party, or service appointee – state officials, Wehrmacht officers and generals and party functionaries. Bormann started skillfully using this effective means of personal influence as early as under Hess. Not only did he make life uneasy for the supreme NSDAP structures, but also defined the personnel policies thoroughout the Third Reich. As a result, when Rudolf Hess vacated his office, Bormann moved in smoothly (he was the first to declare Hess insane).

When he appeared in Hitler's closest entourage, Bormann immediately became the Führer's indispensable advisor. Hitler shared all his plans and considerations with Bormann, first on inner party issues and later on all policies of the Reich. In addition, some time later Bormann developed a remarkable ability: he carefully chose the right moment to divert Hitler's attention from an unpleasant topic by putting in an impressive remark. He could also direct the conversation to the topics Hitler wanted to discuss. Added to these qualities must be Bormann's remarkable memory – something that Hitler especially valued. The more totalitarian the system grew, the more difficult it became to push mountains of problems through Hitler's very limited personal readiness to attend to them. With time this readiness entered a sharp contradiction with reality. The physical and spiritual degradation prevented the Führer from coping with a flood of problems, which caused him terrible moral sufferings. The more irritable and intolerable Hitler became in the last years of the war, the more he needed Bormann, who spent days and nights with the Führer. In short, the Führer could not do without Bormann for even a minute.

Thanks to his ability to simplify and smoothout everything, Bormann succeeded in solving the most complicated and baffling problems. While

doing this, he used his rare talent: his reports were so logical and psychologically impressive that by the time he finished speaking, the desired decision had already been accepted as the only logical one. I must admit that I envied Bormann's abilities and even tried to copy his methods when reporting to my superiors, with little, if any, success, though.

The Third Reich's masterspy Walter Schellenberg, the golden boy of Hitler

As already mentioned, Himmler and Bormann were absolutely different people, opposites of each other in all respects, from physical appearance to character and moral qualities. However, one person from the Hitler entourage was very much like Bormann – the Gestapo Chief, Müller.

I deem it my duty to tell the new German society how once I encountered a totally different Müller, a person of totally different political convictions and faith.

When we were hunting Rote Kapelle (a German antifascist organization cooperating with Soviet intelligence. – **Ed.**), I noticed that the Gestapo chief tried to steer clear of operations directly connected with the liquidation of Soviet spy nets. In the spring of 1943 I attended the conference of police attaches posted at German embassies which took place in the Berlin district of Wannsee. During that conference, Müller accosted me and unexpectedly asked if we could have a few words in private. I must admit that this surprised me very much, because by that time we were already at loggerheads, but Müller sounded so polite.

"Recently," Müller said, "I've been speaking about the secret motivation that had made Rote Kapelle members betray Germany.

"Isn't your personal and professional experience telling you, Schellenberg," Müller said, "that Soviet influence in Western Europe had not only been based on pro-Communist workers, but also engulfed broad intellectual segments? I believe that this phenomenon logically follows from the current economic and political situation and that it has managed to spread so widely because of the spiritual debility of the Western and German culture. I also include here the entire system of the views and attitudes of the Third Reich. Actually, National Socialism is only a kind of fertilizer that is being added to the marshy soil of spiritual uncertainty and intellectual instability which generate political nihilism. In contrast to this, people are starting to see that an integral moral and biological force is gradually starting to act firmly and uncompromisingly in Russia. When they defined the far-reaching ideological and material aims of the world revolution, Russian communists unwillingly imparted positive charges to the declining Western society."

This strange speech was made by the person whose mission in the National-Socialist Germany was to mercilessly combat all manifestations of Communism! Müller leaned back in his comfortable chair and his eyes, red from too much drinking of liquor, regarded his short and puffy fingers for some time.

Master of intrigue, Heinrich Muller hated Schellenberg

"You see, Schellenberg," he continued sarcastically, "I come from the humble quarters of society and it is only thanks to my hard work that I have managed to build my career. As for you, you belong to the intellectual segment. That is why your visiton and your philosophy are totally different from mine. But you belong to those intellectuals who refuse to agree to our development's being bogged down in the stagnant system of conservative traditions. However, there are educated people who are bolder than you, who have resolutely broken away from the old world. I mean some participants in Rote Kapelle, Harnack or Schulze-Boysen, for instance. They are people from your circle, but they are totally different from you. They wouldn't stop halfway, they march forward as true revolutionaries staying loyal to their ideas to the very end. National Socialism is powerless to offer them what they want. As for Communism, it suits them perfectly, especially in the spiritual sphere. The upper crust of our intellectuals with their unstable spiritual potential has failed to transform the National Socialists for the better. The Communist East rushed in to fill the resulting vacuum. If we lose this war, we will lose it not because the Russians are militarily stronger than we are, but because of the decline of the moral standards among the ruling quarters of our society. When I say this, I do not mean Hitler first, I mean the people who are immediately below him. Had Hitler heeded my advice in 1933 and 1938 and carried out a more effective purge, he would not have allowed the Wehrmacht leadership to get him involved in the dirty business of this war."

I must admit that I was starting to feel uneasy: Why should Müller be so frank? As for him, he downed his glass, cast a vicious glance at me and then started right in front of him. I could not help remembering the Gestapo chief's recent cannibalistic remark: "All intellectuals ought to be put in one coal mine, and then the mine ought to be blown up."

The pause was getting too long. I was about to rise when Müller spoke again:

"I cannot make myself change my mind, and I am increasingly convinced that Stalin chose the right way. Stalin is a head higher than all Western leaders. Remember this: we must make a deal with him as soon as possible. It would be such a blow to the hypocritical West, from which they would never recover."

Speaking in his Bavarian dialect, Müller hurled obsenities at both the declining West and the bankrupt ruling quarters of Germany. Since Müller was a living encyclopaedia and knew all the details of private lives of all significant figures of the Reich, I learned a lot of interesting facts during that conversation. Nonetheless, I could not stop thinking: Why did the Gestapo chief need to let me know about this sudden reversal in his political convictions?

I tried to pretend I was not taking his words seriously and even attempted to turn all this into a joke.

"Well, that's nice, Müller buddy," I said ironically, "Let us declare "Heil Stalin" and appoint our Papa Müller the NKVD chief." Müller measured me with a devastating glance, looked at me with contempt and said mockingly:

"Your very nose betrays you, you are full of the Western crap."

There were no more confidences shared with Müller. I could see that the conversation was nearly over and bade him good-bye.

I spent a lot of time trying to get to the bottom of Müller's unprecedented soliloquy and reach a conclusion about the Gestapo chief's words.

It is absolutely clear to me that by 1943 Müller had completely altered his position and stopped believing in Germany's eventual victory. It was then that I found the first real assessment that later led me to conclude that Müller was a Soviet spy. That is why I was not surprised when a German officer told me in 1950 that while in Russian captivity he saw the former Gestapo chief in Moscow. Some time later, Müller was rumoured to be dead in Moscow.

SPECIALIST'S VIEW

We could have used Müller...

The life of Walter Schellenberg contains something unusual, if not mysterious. The seventh child of Gwido Sallenberg, the owner of a small musical instruments factory in Saarbrücken, dropped out of the university and joined Waffen SS.

In eight years Schellenberg progressed from first lieutenant to SS-Gruppenführer and Lt.Gen. of the Police, head of the Sixth Department (foreign intelligence) of the Reich Security Head Office. He belonged to Hitler's immediate entourage.

The defeat of Germany put an end to this brilliant career, and Schellenberg was taken prisoner by the British. He was lucky to have attracted the attention of the British secret service. Actually, it is possible that Schellenberg established contacts with the British secret service as early as the end of the war. The British shielded him, and Schellenberg was not tried among other major war criminals. It was only in 1949 that a tribunal sentenced Schellenberg to six years in prison. However, the West German authorities put in a word for him, the British military administration supported them, and the youngest of the Nazi espionage masters was released in 1951.

The reminiscences of the former head of the Reich's foreign intelligence service turned up in Britain, only to give rise to new doubts: which part of the English-language book published in London (Schellenberg wrote in German) was his genuine reminiscences and which part was the writing of co-authors from the Secret Intelligence Service?

The chapter *Bormann and Müller* is undoubtedly the most interesting in the book. To put it mildly, it comes as a surprise to know that the Gestapo chief, SS Gruppenführer and Lt.General of the Police, Heinrich Müller could have been a Soviet spy.

It is true that Müller disappeared from Berlin in May 1945. Nobody saw him dead, but he was rumoured to have been killed. The official death certificate was issued several years after the war. "Reported dead," just like Bormann.

Was Müller really a Soviet agent? Most specialists agree that Schellenberg had lied and the Gestapo chief had never had business with Moscow.

I spent about fifteen years working for the Soviet intelligence service. In March 1944, I joined the First Directorate of the NKVD, the German section. It was the time when Schellenberg said Müller contacted the Soviet intelligence service. However, working in the section that received all the information about the Reich, I did not know anything about this.

By the way, there were no serious Soviet spy nets in Germany by mid-1944. The powerful spy net created by the Soviet intelligence services of the NKVD, NKGB and the Intelligence Department of the Red Army before the war were destroyed by German counterintelligence, in particular by Müller's Gestapo.

At that time our efforts were aimed at restoring the spy net in Germany as soon as possible, compensating for the losses we incurred from the German counterintelligence, when it blew up the Harnack (Corsican) – Schulze-Boysen (Corporal) and Stöbe (Alte) nets in Berlin, the Trepper (Otto) net in Paris, the Gurevich (Kent) net in Brussels and the Rado (Dora) net in Geneva. Had Müller contacted us, we could have used him.

We had to fish for candidates among German anti-fascists living in the USSR, Soviet Germans, German POWs, to recruit and train them hastily. Equipped with fake documents and radio transmitters, they were dropped or infiltrated into Germany and German-occupied territories in Europe.

Before the war and in the beginning of it, the German intelligence tried similar methods in an attempt to create a large spy net in the USSR. At that time the Germans failed. Three or four years later we arrived at the same frustrating conclusion: the German counterintelligence quickly cracked our agents, many voluntarily turned themselves in to the Gestapo or police, and some agents decided against carrying out our assignments.

Let us return to the talk between Schellenberg and Müller, though. Such a talk did take place surely. Müller must have been the one to start it. Master of intrigue and provocations, he wanted to draw the Reich's masterspy to the slippery ground of a delicate discussion in order to use it against him later. Müller hated the upwardly-mobile intellectual who had made a brilliant career and become the golden boy of Himmler and Hitler.

What about Schellenberg? Why did he need to speculate on Müller's being a Soviet spy?

It is possible that this chapter was dictated to Schellenberg by his colleagues from the Secret Intelligence Service, or the chapter might have simply been added to Schellenberg's memoirs after his death. It was intended to discredit the Soviet Union, which allegedly cooperated with the chief of the Gestapo. After all, the memoirs were published at the peak of the cold war.

Vitaly Chernyavsky

Radio Liberty opens Moscow bureau

For the first time in the history of international journalism a correspondent's office was opened in accordance with a decree by the head of state

Decree No. 93, signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on August 27, says: "In connection with the request from the directors of the independent radio station Liberty/Free Europe, financed by the US Congress, and taking into account its role in the objective informing of citizens of the Russian Federation and the world public about the democratic processes in Russia, in the country, and in the world, and about the activity of the lawful leadership of the Russian Federation during the coup in the USSR, I resolve: 1. To allow the directors of the independent radio station Liberty/Free Europe to open a permanent bureau in Moscow with correspondents' offices on the territory of the Russian Federation..."

New Times reporter **Konstantin ISAKOV** met with **Vladimir MATUSEVICH,** director of the Russian service of Radio Liberty.



Vladimir Matusevich. The decree was a complete surprise for me. Savik Shuster (a staff member of Radio Liberty) and I arrived in Moscow without visas. We received them at the Sheremetievo airport under instructions from the foreign minister of Russia. I have not been in Russia for 23 years, and had lost hope of returning. A flight to the moon seemed more likely.

Incidentally, here is what KGB chairman Kryuchkov wrote to Yuri Ryzhov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet's committee for science, two months before the putsch in reply to his inquiry about the KGB's "black lists": "S. Shuster, a citizen of Canada, has not been allowed to enter the USSR because since 1988 he has been a staff member of the Russian service of Radio Liberty, whose activity is designed to undermine the Soviet constitutional system and has prepared broadcasts aimed at discrediting our system and the President of the USSR."

N.T. How did you receive the news of the putsch?

V.M. I woke up at six o'clock Munich time. There was a call from the chief of the Russian news department. I understood that he was absolutely serious, that it was not an All Fools' Day joke. However, I could not believe what I heard. I switched on the Moscow television, but instead of the usual morning programme, the announcer was reading out documents issued by the State Emergency Committee. I rushed to the radio, thinking that it was not an entirely unexpected surprise. I tried to recollect the past events and wondered why no one had taken seriously earlier open calls for a military coup.

I thought that the dictatorship would endure. In the corridor of the radio station I came across an employee of our research department. She said quietly and confidently: "It is a matter of a few days."

When I saw that Yeltsin and his team were firmly resisting and that the people who gathered around the White House were prepared to defend the Russian Parliament, I understood that Gorbachev's efforts over the past six years had not been futile. This man has done for the country something similar to a miracle. People now feel that they are individuals.

N.T. Do you think it has become possible thanks to Gorbachev?

V.M. I think, Gorbachev is one of the greatest and most tragic figures of the 20th century. In spite of the monstrous, absurd and harmful things connected with Gorbachev's activity, without him Russia would not have Yeltsin and those who defended the White House.

N.T. What were you doing in the days of the coup?

V.M. There was no special heroism. Staff members went to the studios and worked day and night. I even feel ashamed of saying that. It is not a great merit to work more or less professionally and honestly in a safe place in Munich, far away from Russia.

N.T. You probably understood that Radio Liberty remained all of a sudden the only source which could give our people the truth about the events.

V.M. We realized that. I feel terribly proud that, unlike the BBC, Radio Liberty did not broadcast the news of Gorbachev's death. I thought it impermissible to broadcast such sensational and unconfirmed news only for the sake of being the first.

N.T. The KGB has lately been the only Soviet organization which continued to depict Radio Liberty as a cover for spies and to talk about its anti-Soviet activity. What kind of relations can you have with this body in the future?

V.M. I was glad to learn that KGB's news chairman Vadim Bakatin handed the list of KGB agents working at the Soviet radio and television to its new chairman Yegor Yakovlev. I think this was done not for the sake of vengeance, humiliation, or annihilation. It is disgusting when a journalist works in the radio or in a newspaper and knows that someone informs against him, and plays dirty tricks on him.

The new Czechoslovak authorities have given Free Europe a list of Czechoslovak state security agents who worked at this radio station. I hope that Bakatin will be sensible enough to help us get rid of the successors of Oleg Tumanov.

It is evidently by a signal from Moscow that a month before the coup they became very active and did everything so that at the moment of the coup we would be as ineffective as possible, if not paralyzed.

N.T. How was it manifested?

V.M. Excuse me, I cannot say anything more now.

N.T. But Liberty remains an American radio station, and since we are talking about the KGB, the question of influence exerted by the CIA arises, too.

V.M. I do not see a special connection here, but I understand that the need for intelligence information remains. The KGB will apparently increase its presence in the CIA, the Pentagon and companies working in the field of electronics. However, the American radio station does not have secrets which the KGB needed to uncover in the interests of the Soviet Union's national security. Why should the KGB keep people at Liberty who discredit the radio station and foment discord between various groups?

N.T. All restrictions on the activity of the press have been lifted in the Soviet Union. Are you not afraid of competition?

V.M. I thought about this two or three years ago, when a breakthrough occurred in the printing of books banned earlier. However, precisely in these years the number of our listeners increased. I think it is wonderful to compete in professionalism. However, the press will continue for a long time to gravitate towards one or the other bank, to a firm parapet. I think the epithet "independent" should sound more and more persistently in relation to our radio station. This will determine our place in the unlimited world of information.

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

The name of Lev Shestov, that eminent Russian philosopher and culturalist, cannot, we think, be listed among the forgotten. True, for most people the name does not ring a bell, but experts on the history of Russian philosophy are quite familiar with his writings, even though they were not published in this country after the October 1917 coup. This is not surprising, as firstly, he perhaps more than any other Russian thinker felt the impact of European tradition; and secondly, since he wrote very little dealing with socio-political subjects, he was viewed by the advocaters of "pure ideology" as less of a "heretic" than, for instance, Nikolai Berdyaev, who was not averse to writing about politics. Indeed, in this land of "socialist realism" Berdyaev has not escaped disgrace, even in spite of a certain degree of "Bolshevization" for which he was so soundly rebuked by fellow-writers in emigration. But as far as Lev Shestov was concerned, even during the stagnation period in this country a doctoral thesis could have been presented without that much criticism mandatory in treatises on "bourgeois philosophy." Thus, in the Soviet *Philosophical Encyclopaedia* that was put out in the 1970s, the reader will find a pretty good entry, and especially good one for the time, about Lev Shestov.

Still Shestov did write about political subjects, though not much. Excerpts from one such essay follow. Written in the spring of 1920, it was published in that same year in Paris in its French translation. At that time preparations were also made to publish it abroad separately, as a booklet in Russian. Though it got published, its lot was a sad one, as the entire edition, some of which was intended for Russia's readership, was destroyed by the publisher, a Soviet subject. He was horrified when he read it, and so retained only some hundred copies. Hence this booklet, entitled *What is Russian Bolshevism?* is a double rarity, bibliographically and as an example of a political pamphlet that was uncharacteristic for Shestov. Incidentally, the excerpts that follow are featured under the initial heading of the manuscript.

A few words about Lev Shestov himself. Born in Kiev, his real name was Lev Shvartsman. As a law student at Kiev University, he took an interest in philosophy, which he sustained both abroad and, subsequently, in religious philosophical groups in Moscow. He taught philosophy at Kiev University from 1918 until 1920 when he emigrated. It was the impressions he gained from the first few years after the Bolshevik coup that moved him to write this essay. Otherwise, his range of philosophical treatises and cultural research earned him international fame as one of the most exciting exponents of existentialism. Indeed, he deserves to be ranked alongside such existentialist philosophers as Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Nikolai Berdyaev, and Albert Camus. He couches his profound thought in a most imaginative, superbly written style.

Bolshevism per se

Lev Shestov (1866 – 1938)

Something worse than war is taking place in Russia. There people are killing not each other, but their own country. They have absolutely no inkling of what they are doing. Some think they are doing a great thing, that they are saving the human race. Others don't think at all, but simply adapt to the new conditions, looking out for Number One. They do not care what will happen tomorrow; and do not believe in a tomorrow, in the same way that they do not remember what yesterday was like. Such people comprise the overwhelming majority in Russia, as incidentally, everywhere else. Strange as it may seem after a cursory glance, it is these people of today who are wholly engrossed in their trifling interests, who are making history; they hold in their hands the future of Russia, the future of the human race, the future of the entire world.

This is exactly what Bolshevism's ideological leaders realize least of all... The Bolshevik regime is... despotism, moreover, a benighted despotism. The Bolsheviks, like Russia's politicians of the recent past, eschew not only virtue (a sceptical outlook that politicians may be allowed) but also knowledge, intellect. As conscientious guardians of the truly Russian political tradition, a tradition still fresh in memories of Russian serfdom, they believe only in the club, in brute, physical force... The current commissars know only the *Chrezvychaika*, the Emergency Committee and are convinced that this is the consummation of wise statesmanship. The sundry freedoms, the immunity of the person, etc., are all vapid inventions of the scholarly European doctrinaires; in Russia they can very well dispense with these freedoms and immunity. However, emergency committees have yet to introduce tranquility, and brutality and summary repression have yet to bring peace to any state.

Though I have called the Bolsheviks idealists, I have also said that they believe in nothing but crude, physical force. At a cursory glance these seem to be mutually exclusive assertions. After all, the idealist believes in the power of the word, not in physical force. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks, reared in the atmosphere of tsarist serfdom, advocated freedom only while power was in the hands of their opponents. As soon as they usurped power, they renounced all freedoms without the least remorse, licentiously proclaiming the very idea of freedom a bourgeois prejudice which, while precious for the old perverted Europe, was of no value whatsoever for Russia...

All who wish to understand what is taking place in Russia today must pay special attention to the initial manifestations of Bolshevik state-making. All that they did afterwards in closely interwoven with their very first decrees. Here in Europe and also partly in Russia, many are inclined to think that Bolshevism is something of an innovation, even a tremendous innovation. They err, as Bolshevism has never been able to create anything and will never create anything, and therein lies its most grievous sin with respect to Russia and the entire world, inasmuch as Russia is linked economically, politically, and morally with the rest of the world. Bolshevism creates nothing: it lives only at the expense of what was created before it appeared in the scene...

...I wish to stress just one feature which I think is most characteristic of the substance of Bolshevism. Bolshevism, I repeat, is reactionary, as it does not possess the ability to create anything. It uses what lies at hand, what others have made. In short, the Bolsheviks are parasites by their very nature. Naturally, the Bol-

sheviks neither realize nor recognize that. Even if they did, they would hardly openly admit it. However, in every field they touch upon this salient specific feature of theirs is felt. They themselves have formulated their objective as starting out by destroying everything and only then building whatever they think necessary. Were the ideological blue-eyed Bolsheviks capable of reflecting on what they say they would be horrified. This formula is at the other end of the spectrum from the basic teachings of socialism. It stands to reason that Marx would have not recognized the men promulgating this programme as disciples and followers. Marx believed that socialism was the supreme form of society's economic organization, which would with the same cast-iron logic emanate from the previous bourgeois organization that had followed feudal organization... Socialism did not at all envisaged demolition of the bourgeois economic system; on the contrary, it presumed that everything the previous system had created would be fully preserved intact. Accordingly, Marx saw socialism's task as one of construction. The transformation of the bourgeois economy into a socialist one signified that by reorienting to a higher, better organization of production, the country's production potential would not be destroyed but amplified. In short, this was a positive task. But the Bolsheviks immediately renounced it, as they obviously felt it was not their job to create. It is much simpler, easier, more within reach to exist at the expense of what was created earlier. The Bolsheviks in effect demolished nothing, but simply exist at the expense of what they have found ready made by the previous organism. When Lenin was reproached because the Bolsheviks were engaged in pillage, he said: "Yes, we are looting, but we are looting what was looted." Let that be so. Let it really be that the Bolsheviks are taking away what had been seized by force before. That changes nothing. The Bolsheviks remain parasites inasmuch as they do not add anything to what had been ceated before and drink of the juices of the organism off of which they spunge. I will not be so bold as to say how long that can continue, how long Russia can feed the Bolsheviks... The Bolsheviks did all they possibly could to prevent the revolution from accomplishing its basic mission of emancipating the Russian people. It is definitely obvious that they, in effect, have even failed to accomplish the task of destruction. They destroyed most of the national wealth and killed off in the prisons and emergency committees a good number of the previous ministers, governors, and wealthy people. I shall not expatiate upon this, as everyone knows how the Latvian emergency committees and the Chinese soldiers operate. However, they have not done away with either the bureaucracy or the bourgeoisie. Not at all! Never before in Russia has the bureaucracy, that idle pitiful, good-for-nothing bureaucracy, multiplied with such unprecedented rapidity. Each institution and office has at least ten times more employees than one needed to accomplish its purpose. Further, hardly one of ten such institutions and offices is actually necessary...

Alive deep down in the heart of the people was the belief in truth, a belief reflected in the best Russian writings. One even though the people believed in the tsar, who was seen as the victim of evil advisers. But when the revolution erupted, it at once became clear that the people no longer believed in the tsar. Oddly enough, throughout the entire vastness of Russia there was not a single shire, city, town or even village that would have risen up to defend the deposed tsar. The tsar has gone and good riddance: we can get along without him. The truth the people sought was not in the hands of the tsar, but in the hands of those who had fought the tsar, which explains the stupendous success, achieved by the Socialist Revolutionaries at the start of the revolution... The Socialist Revolutionaries were jubilant. A bloodless revolution, they exclaimed. Such is Russia for you, totally unlike rotten Europe!

However, what told here for the second time was the political helplessness and mediocrity of that section of Russia's intelligentsia who inherited power after the tsar's overthrow. As I have said, the Provisional Government was not capable of doing anything. It reigned, but did not rule. The Soviets ruled behind its back. They did not achieve anything positive; on the contrary they caused the utmost chaos. Within these bodies a power struggle raged between the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks. Both appealed to the people. But for several months running the people remained silent, hoping the government would find the ways and means of restructuring the country in line with those ideals of justice and law that lived on in the hearts of the people. However, there was no government, but simply embattled political parties, who were least of all ready to govern. Nobody knew of the people and their needs, nor did they want to. All they cared about was who would seize power. As they believed power would accrue to the side capable of recruiting the majority of the population, these political parties competed in a very special way to see which of them could promise the people more and sooner. Promises were made without end. Now they let the people seize the land or possessions of the landlords, their houses, or even the squires themselves. "It's all yours, so take it," was what representatives of these parties declared. As a result, little by little the people arrived at the conviction that all their ideals and all their awareness of what was right and lawful were worthless. What had been before remained. Right was the party with the claws and the teeth, that could be first to seize things. While the squires were in power they were right. But now that they had been ousted, those who had taken over from them would become the squires. Consequently, in the fervour of their power struggle the Socialists completely failed to see, and as it would seem to this day fail to see that they have achieved the direct opposite of what they wanted. Their objective had been to plant in the popular mind the ideals of supreme social truth, but instead they achieved the expulsion from the minds of the people of every conception of the truth. Our politicians have always been poor psychologists...

Had Lenin's supporters given a really serious thought to that vision of history culled from Hegel, they would have realized that they were but pawns in the hands of fate, pawns that produce nothing but misery

The intelligentsia and the Russian people are too greatly concerned about that pie in the sky. They do not know and are not fond of thinking about mundane interests. Immediately after the tsar's overthrow, when Russia was still celebrating the honeymoon of liberty, when representatives of all the different political parties unabashedly uttered everything on their minds, that was most astonishing. Indeed, wherever one went one heard talk of Russia's lofty mission. Nobody was able or wanted to think of how Russia should be organized. Any mention of that aroused indignation... Every Russian writer is first and foremost a philosopher. Even the politician and party functionary are more concerned with how to substantiate their judgements from the philosophical angle. Let me repeat that we have an endless variety of philosophical outlooks. However, they all see eye to eye on one thing... "Better let Russia perish than be philistine, like repugnant old Europe!" a party functionary from the extreme left wing exclaimed with the same fervour. In European countries the kings have been ousted

but in European minds the kings continue to live. What they tought about was not themselves, but the good earth. They organized things for today and for tomorrow, combated poverty, cold, hunger, and epidemics, set up factories, plants, railways, parliaments, and law courts... Of course, had we gone no further than dethroning the tsar, but retained the tsar in our heads, we would not have stooped to the depths we have. Russia would have retained her unity, she would not have disintegrated. The people would not have died from hunger, cold, or epidemics. Liberated from age-old bondage the peasants and the workers would have breathed more freely. But is that the kingdom of God? Would not there remain many difficulties and much suffering for the Russian in the renovated Russia?..

Perhaps after that digression the reader will more clearly realize why I have labeled the Bolsheviks parasites. But their very nature they cannot create and never will. Though Bolshelvism's ideological leaders may play around with such terms as "construction" and "to construct" as much as they please, they are absolutely incapable of engaging in positive construction, as the spirit of serfdom with which their entire activity, even their entire vulgarized ideology, is imbued, kills all construction in the embryo... It goes against the nature of the honest, conscientious, and gifted to tolerate slavery. They need freedom as much as the air they breathe. The Bolshelviks do not understand that... Benighted mediocre dullards cluster around the Bolshevik government, caricaturing even the worthiest and the best that the Bolsheviks may have.

The Russians must, when getting up and going to bed constantly repeat that wherever freedom does not exist there can be no proper organization of life, no well-being, generally nothing that is appreciated on this earth

There is no question but that willy-nilly the worker-peasant government is putting its best foot forward to institute a dictatorship over the proletariat... I know well, indeed, too well, the utter poverty in which Russia's peasants and workers languished. Unfortunately, the ideological Bolsheviks are not aware of this, though the legion of their hangers-on are. They do not know that the causes of this poverty should be sought, first and foremost, in our country's political regime. Wherever freedom does not exist – the Russian must, when getting up or going to bed, tirelessly repeat the seemingly commonplace – there can be neither proper organization, well-being, nor generally anything that men on earth appreciate.

Only the diehard serf-owners of the old and supposedly rejuvenated Russia are unaware of that truism. With conviction I say that October 25, 1917, must be regarded as the day on which the Russian revolution failed. The Bolsheviks did not save the workers and peasants of Russia, they bertrayed them. Phraseology even of the most bombastic character remains merely phraseology. What the Russian peasant and worker, even the educated Russian needed first was to acquire the title of citizen. It had to be impressed upon him that he was not a slave, whom anyone could mock, but that he enjoyed rights, sacrosanct rights which he and everyone else were mandated to cherish. The Provisional Government proclaimed that as soon as it got going, and everyone knew that. However, "the rights of the man and citizen," rights for which this miserable country had hankered for centuries, remained on paper. Actually only several months later the old lawlessness began to be restored. The Bolshevik decrees and the numerous Bolshevik proclamations flooding Russia were understood and interpreted by the population as a call to seize and plunder: "Take what you can, and as much as you can, as afterwards it will be too late." It is indeed hard to describe the orgy of looting that overwhelmed all of Russia...

...The disinherited must, risking health, and even life itself, dedjcate their labour and all their possessions to the good of the "whole." That is what Bolshevism, which promised the workers and peasants so much, brought. However, the "ideological" Bolsheviks have yet one more argument, the last they can trot out. Yes, they say, we have given the Russian peasant and worker nothing and we have destroyed Russia. However, it could not have been otherwise. Russia is too backward and the Russians are too brutish to be capable of accepting our ideas. However, the matter is not one of Russia and the Russians. Our objective is broader. We want to "blow up" the West, do away with the babbitry of Europe and America. So we shall continue to feed the fire in Russia, until its flames reach out to our neighbours and from them to the entire world. Such is our supreme goal, such our ultimate, most cherished dream. We will give Europe the ideas while Europe in turn, will give us its technology, its skills, its organizational talent, etc. Such is the *ultimaratio* (ultimate reasoning) of the Bolsheviks. What is its worth?

During the considerable time I spent in regions under Bolshevik rule, I noticed one extremely curious circumstance. The youngest and by no means cleverest were best at conjecturing and predicting events. On the contrary, the older and the wiser always erred. They thought that Russia would not remain under the Bolsheviks for long, that the people would rise up against them, that as soon as a more or less well-organized army appeared, the Bolshevik forces would melt away like snow in the sunshine.

However, reality fooled the experienced and the wise... The young, the unwise, proved to be the prophets. Today, when trying to forecast the future, one wonders on whom one should rely: the wise or the fools? The wise apparently proceed from what they themselves think obvious, that in their actions people and nations are motivated by vital "interests" and instinctively feel what is useful and what is harmful. They clearly saw that Bolshevism was pernicious, that it would generate unprecedented misery, cold, hunger, poverty, bondage, and the like. Hence, they contended, it could not survive for long. It might hang on for weeks, even months, but would then collapse of itself. However, more than two years have passed, indeed it will soon be three, but Bolshevism is still holding on. Despite the hunger, the cold, and the relentless epidemics. Consequently, we may ask, are people really motivated by common sense? However, we will be told that these are the Russians, who can tolerate need, disinheritance, whatever you like. In Russia it is indeed the very young and the not very clever who are the prophets. In Europe it is different.

But is it really different? I would not hazard a guess. Europe is nevertheless gradually coping with the difficulties and will possibly win out. In other words, it seems that in Russia, owing to benighted state, the Lord above as in remote Biblical times, has produced Babel and has reduced people to dire savagery, whereas in Europe its people have stayed their horses and outwitted the Lord above, its people and nations have again begun to cooperate, and are ordained to go on building the Tower of Babel of modern culture in spite of the Lord's will... However, Bolshevism started out with destruction and is not capable of anything else.

Were Lenin and those of his comrades, whose conscientiousness and disinterestedness are above suspicion, sufficiently perceptive, they would have realized that they are but pawns in the hands of history... Their dream of blowing up Europe, should that ever come true, will spell not the triumph but the doom of socialism, and plunge the long-suffering nations into supreme misery... Only the future, perhaps even the not so distant future, can determine whether the West will fall victim to illusions and taste Russia's lot, or whether destiny has already had its surfeit of human misery...

A "dissident" member of the CPSU Central Committee



He appeared on the scene after April 1985. His popularity grew literally by the hour, and no wonder: he was the author of a bulky volume about Stalin and Stalinism, and of many other books, about lesser leaders which were published abroad. After censorship had been abolished and all taboos removed, Roy Medvedev's works found their way to the popular masses. The historian Medvedev levelled devastating criticism against the brutalities of Stalinism, against the corrupt, power-seeking, lying, and hypocritical partocracy.

Later, other authors published much more fundamental and serious studies of our terrible history. Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *GULAG Archipelago* became accessible to the general public, and our magazines carried articles which not merely stated facts but projected a sweeping panorama of the totalitarian system which has enslaved the whole nation, every one of us. Guilt and the awareness of the tragedy combined to compel many of us to make an agonizing reappraisal of the years we had lived through; this revaluation has been done by everyone, whoever he is and whoever his sympathies lie with.

In the meantime, Roy Medvedev embarked on a political career as well. His interviews, newspaper articles and TV appearances followed one after another. Finally, the "dissident" Medvedev became a People's Deputy of the USSR. Against the background of the hubbub and racket of the early parliamentary discussions, the rasping and accusing voice of Medvedev the unmasker was audible. Before long, however, the assertiveness of the Deputy who became a member of the Supreme Soviet, started getting on the nerves of the other Deputies and of the general public. He tried to foil the commission which looked into Gdlyan's case, and so was removed from the post of its chairman. Ever more frequently and kind of automatically, Lukianov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, looked for the former dissident's raised hand, and the latter began to "substantiate" this or that suggestion by the adamant speaker who had mastered the magical ability to push through decisions which suited him.

Something inexplicable and incomprehensible about that enigmatic figure, Medvedev, put one on the alert. It became public knowledge that he had written all his exposes in his Moscow apartment, that he had never been put on trial or threatened with banishment from the country, that some mysterious force had protected him from the sorry lot of the other dissidents. More and more questions were asked about this.

In Brezhnev's time, when Andropov had been promoted from a Central Committee Secretary to the KGB Chairman, many dissidents were kicked out of the country, and many of them were confined to jails and mental institutions. Andrei Dmitriyevich Sakharov was exiled to the city of Gorky, but the fearless Medvedev ignored KGB informers and kept penning his revealing books. I attributed that queer situation to Medvedev's good luck but otherwise took little interest in the authour.

In a conversation with Yelena Georgiyevna Bonner, I asked her why Andrei Dmitriyevich Sakharov, according to his reminiscences, had sharply discouraged Roy Medvedev's attempts to establish close relations with him. She replied that Sakharov had never mentioned the man's name and preferred to keep well away from him. "Nevertheless," Yelena Bonner remarked, "Medvedev feigned ignorance of Sakharov's opinion of him and, writing in a May 1991, issue of the *Sovetskaya Rossiya* newspaper, alleged once again that he had been close to Andrei Dmitriyevich. I lost all patience with Medvedev and rebuked him in *Demokraticheskaya Rossiya.*"

The motive of "keep well away from Medvedev" is also present in Vladimir Bukovsky's book *The Wind Comes Back.*

Roy Medvedev was, indeed, sharply critical of Stalin, but Brezhnev seemed to suit him fine. Be that as it may, the man's "dissidence" was rather tame.

As much as I hate the idea of discussing Roy Medvedev at all – let God be his judge – I feel I must do it today. The tragic days of the coup attempted by a junta of high-ranking Party apparatchiks, members of the CPSU Central Committee, are receding into history. I see in my mind's eye televised scenes of the emergency session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In their frantic attempts to justify their actions and to cast aspersions on others, which added up to a political orgy, our MPs lost all self-control and exposed their true selves – uncamouflaged by generalities and generous promises – for all the nation to see. Fortunately, the voices of honest and courageous politicians were also heard at the session. They fought tooth and nail – I cannot put it any other way – for every bit of the truth, for every bit of hope in decisions and resolutions.

Many revealed their true, hitherto unknown, selves. Deputy Medvedev was more active than ever. He worked like a horse, out to prove that he was worth his salt. He was no longer the Medvedev of old, Medvedev the dissident, the human rights activist, the anti-Stalinist, and the truth-seeker. Dashing around the hall, like a hunted-down animal, was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the very Central Committee which had already ceased to exist formally, but which, nevertheless, was going all out to prove its innocence and to stress its devotion to millions of rank-and-file Communists. Roy Medvedev was zealously fulfilling his Party assignment.

As a party member, I have the moral right to claim that Communists have no need for Roy Medvedev's services in protecting them. Now I can tell myself and everyone: it is the Party that has withdrawn from me and from many of my friends. It has withdrawn from the hearts of millions of Communists. Yegor Yakovlev, one of the most courageous journalists, who has never budged an inch from the idea of renovating the country, said once: "Why should we withdraw from the Party, let them go!" He realized earlier than I and many others that "they" would never go of their own accord. He has been proven correct.

Powerful democratic forces are gathering on the left flank of our history. God forbid, there might even be a witch-hunt. Let Communist Roy Medvedev go on writing his historical novels, and may they be released not only abroad but in this country as well if they find a publisher.

I do not regard this man as the epitome of evil and the only source of the anxiety which is haunting me today. There are many others like him. I am appealing not to God but to reason: let us get rid of our slavish urge to create idols. Otherwise we shall bring upon ourselves another junta and its minions.

Alexei Adzhubei

The defenders of the White House of Russia

For three days and nights, people were on the barricades outside the Russian parliament building. Millions of people are grateful to those hundreds upon hundreds of famous, yet unknown people...

On the evening of August 20th, the Echo of Moscow radio station quite unexpectedly gave the mike to 27-year-old **Vaidotas Varevičius,** an obstetrician and gynecologist at the Vilnius hospital No. 6 and chairman of Lithuania's Medical Trade Union, who informed Muscovites in detail how to behave when faced with tanks. So as not to be scared, he said, people should hold hands, otherwise they will get panicky and will disperse. He advised people to take some hot tea or coffee with them, since it could be cold at night, and something warm to put on, as well as something to eat. He asked the Moscow City Soviet, where he had spoken before that, to organize a steady supply of hot food and take care of other necessities. No one was aware how long the threat would last.

Vaidotas knew what he was talking about – he acquired this experience during the events in Vilnius in January. And he concluded his speech by saying that the Lithuanian people supported the Muscovites, since in the face of dictatorship every one is equal. His speech left a feeling of warmth and peace.

Like every one else in Lithuania, Vaidotas at first thought that the developments in Vilnius were a repetition of the January events. But then he learned that Moscow was the centre of the coup. He realized that this time the destiny of democracy would be decided in Russia, rather than in Lithuania. He left for Moscow.

"I wanted to share my experience with the defenders of the White House," he says, "to give them moral support, and tell them that people in Lithuania were unanimous in their attitude to the events in Russia – it was a government coup. I could speak only about technical details, which Muscovites had to learn. I did not want them to repeat the mistakes we made in January."

Having spoken on the Echo of Moscow radio, Vaidotas Varevičius headed for the White House, and when he saw the number of military vehicles amassed there, he became worried for those standing in the square. He joined them, nevertheless.

* * *

Radio Liberty has proved that it is indispensible in the coup d'etat conditions. Its Moscow correspondents, 27-year-old **Andrei Babitsky,** and 29-year-old **Mikhail Sokolov,** broadcast for three days and nights non-stop from the 11th floor of the White House. That terrible night from the 20th to the 21st of August, when it seemed that the assault was inevitable, Liberty was the only national and international mass media means which could report on the situation around the Russian parliament.

Andrei Babitsky is a Muscovite. After finishing school, he tried his hand at many different jobs – a stoker, cinema operator, watchman, and a concrete worker until he came to a semi-legal magazine *Glasnost*, published by Sergei Grigoryants. When they stopped jamming Radio Liberty, and the attitude towards it changed for the better, Andrei began working with it. He describes his views as liberally conservative.

On the morning of the coup Andrei was awakened by his colleague Mikhail Sokolov. They guessed that the centre of opposition to the reaction and military dictatorship would be in the White House, and headed for it.

"On the night from the 20th to the 21st, we felt that the storm would start at any moment, and we decided to remain in the building until it started and then, if we could, leave the house and cover the events from some other place," says Andrei. He doubted that the coup headed by such a leader as Yanayev could be serious and enduring. Probably that explains why the correspondents did not lose their sense of humour and sounded cheerful even at 3 in the morning.

Mikhail Sokolov was born in Petrozavodsk. He graduated from the photography department of the journalism faculty of Moscow State University. In 1983, he came to work at *Sovetskaya Rossiya* newspaper. A year later he was dismissed for "his big mouth and disagreement with the leadership." His sharp tongue came in handy at Radio Liberty, and his political views at *Sobesednik*. He supports the radical wing of the Democratic Russia movement.

When he learned about the coup, he was very glad that he had just read a book about the underground work of the Polish Solidarity organization. Among the things he took with him to the White House were his documents and money. He thought he would be arrested. He believes that their broadcasts would have been impossible without the help of their counterparts on duty in the Munich studio of Radio Liberty, Savik Shuster (who shortly before the coup was not allowed to enter the Soviet Union), Vladimir Kromas, and Vsevolod Rar.

* * *

The weakest place in the defence of the Russian White House was the pass issuing bureau. It had the fewest people defending it, while the stairs made very comfortable approaches for those who wanted to storm the building. The third hundred of volunteers

were guarding the entrance. But the newly arrived people were not met by the volunteers, but by a 50-year-old monk **Germogen,** who resides in the Troitsa-Sergiyev monastery. During the three days

he kept repeating: "God will save Russia."

When Moscow was burying the victims of the coup, the monk, surrounded by Cossaks, carried the portrait of Tsar Nicholas II. "Please, accept my condolences upon the death of the innocent victims of Bolsheviks," repeated Germogen. He said not a word about anything else. "I can't possibly talk with the coffins all around."

* * *

The coup coincided with the opening of the Congress of Compatriots. **Mstislav Rostropovich** and Galina Vishnevskaya were sent invitations long beforehand, but Rostropovich refused to take part in the congress. He had already said everything he could when he attended the Sakharov Congress and his schedule was very tight.

The maestro learnt about the coup from TV news. His family takes a great interest in politics. They receive a lot of "left-wing" newspapers, their TV set receives Moscow, and Rostropovich played Bach and Dvořak among the ruins of the Berlin Wall. When he learned of the coup, he told his daughter Lena that he was going to the bank, which was true: he needed money to go to Moscow. And he left a letter for Galina, who was in London – in case he didn't return.

Of course, in Moscow the question for a visa arose. Rostropovich remembered that his name should be on the list of those invited to the congress. He was right. When he passed customs, he couldn't restrain himself any longer, and told the guard: "I haven't come for the congress, I'm going to the barricades." To his surprise, what he heard in reply was: "Good boy!"

On his way to the White House he called on his sister, who lives close to Presnya, and from there on to the Russian parliament. For a long time he stood in the rain talking about the junta using the language which is not accepted in parliament. He was noticed from the balcony, and the submachine gunners were sent to escort him into the building. He refused to go, shouting that he should be with common people and not with the leadership. But then agreed: Russian authorities are not such bad company. When everything was over, he ordered a thanks-giving service for the saving of Russia in Obydenskaya Church. Tears streamed down his cheeks as he stood praying there. And then he went to the monument of Dzerzhinsky. Witnesses say that somebody sat at the monument's foot, playing the accordion. Rostropovich sat down beside him and suggested that the pedestal be left intact for a future monument to Solzhenitsyn.

Although Rostropovich did not play during his visit to Moscow, he received as many flowers as usual. He asked that they be placed on the graves of the killed heroes.

During those three days the telephone in his sister's apartment rang some 200 times. Friends and correspondents kept calling Rostropovich, but he talked only with those who stood on the barricades.

Leonid Goldin

* * *

"I came here to atone for my guilt." This is how the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia **Boris Pankin** described his mission in an interview with our magazine last year. He meant Soviet tanks on the streets of Prague on August 21, 1968. On the night of

August 21 of this year, when the tanks of the same reactionary forces were moving along the streets of Moscow, half an hour before teh storming of the White House scheduled by the State Committee for the State of Emergency, Ambassador B.Pankin and Minister-Councellor A.Lebedev spread through the Czech TV company a note of protest "against the barbarian and illegal actions of the SCSE forces."

Born in 1931, Boris Pankin belongs to the generation of the 1960s. In 1953, he graduated Moscow University and rose all the way from a probationer to the Editor-in-Chief of *Komsomolskaya Pravda* newspaper. The paper he headed between 1965 and 1973, like Tvardovsky's *Novy Mir*, was the outpost of the freedom-loving public consciousness.

A writer, essayist and publicist, he became a diplomat, but obviously did not learn to conceal his views. This fact repeatedly caused dissatisfaction among those Foreign Ministry officials who hurried to take down the President's portraits during the coup.

On the day of the coup, Pankin's two children were in Moscow. His daughter spent the night from the 20th to 21 of August at the *Nezavisimaya Gazeta's* headquarters, helping to prepare the next issue of the banned publication. His son spent it on the barricades outside the White House.

In the above-mentioned interview for the *NT*, Boris Pankin raised the question of departification of our missions abroad. During the days of the coup, the Soviet Ambassador took a decisive step – he and his wife left the CPSU.

* * *

Twenty-three-year-old lieutenant **Nikolai Sytnik** was one of the first Soviet officers to come to the building of the Russian parliament. On August 19, after completing his duty shift at the 146th motor depot of the USSR Defence Ministry, he changed into civilian clothes and went to the barricades. During all the dramatic days and nights he was together with the 6th hundred of volunteers. And on the night of the 20-21st, he came dressed in his officer's uniform and brought to the Russian White House 12 soldier volunteers from his unit. They brought along two trucks from the motor depot. Later on they were used to bring food to people outside the parliament building and to drive deputies around Moscow to talk with military formations.

The twelve soldiers and officers were registered as the first military formation of Russia's Defence Ministry.

When the situation

around the White House began normalizing, Nikolai was to be sent back to his old unit. But his fellow servicemen did not sympathize with his behaviour, and called him a "criminal" and a "deserter." So Nikolai has no desire or means to return to his former place of work, but he is ready to serve the people and the country. Nor can Nikolai return home. His friends say that people from the unit had already called on his parents to learn the whereabouts of their son. They warned that he would definitely be arrested.

* * *

Around one o'clock in the morning of August 21, the correspondents of Radio Liberty broadcast from the 11th floor of the White House: "A little ship has arrived here. It tied up at the White House embankment. We call it the *Aurora*. In fact, it was not a little ship, but the first of the Moscow-river boats which came to defend the White House. It was followed by four other boats which were pulling two barges. The river fleet had decided to take part in the defence.

The captain of the ship *Rechnoy-37*, now most probably renamed the *Aurora*, **Alexander Komovich,** was the first to realize that the parliament could be attacked from the river. The river fleet decided to defend the White House on the 19th on the initiative of their captains and on the decision made at a trade union meeting. The idea belonged to Komovich. Later they were addressed by Silayev, who was not at the White House because he was forming a back-up headquarters of resistance to the coup in case of the parliament's rout.

Komovich finished the Moscow technical school of the river fleet, served in the army and worked at the Moscow shipbuilding factory. Five years ago he was appointed captain of the *Rechnoy-37*. On the crucial night, his ship was followed by the *Rechnoy-21*, the *Rechnoy-44*, the "Rechnoy-25" and the "Volga-32." The flagship's board carried the sign, "The Fleet supports Russia's President."

How the Gioconda was stolen

August 21, 1991, marked the 80th anniversary of the day when the *Mona Lisa*, the world's most famous painting, was stolen. The thief, Vincenzo Perugia, was arrested in Florence two years later, and *Gioconda* was returned to the Louvre. Since then, the great work of art has given rise to a host of rumours, conjectures, and versions. Here is one of them.

Gavriil Petrosyan

Early one May morning in 1911, Heinrich Bang, a merchant well known in Paris but hardly familiar to anyone in Boston, walked into a mansion owned by Charles Dileny, an American multi-millionaire, and ascended a wide marble staircase. Dileny's privacy was not to be invaded on Sundays, but he had made an exception for Bang. What's more, Bang was expected.

"Well?" Dileny asked impatiently.

"You didn't give me too much time, but I found the right artist, perhaps the only one equal to this responsible task. He is an exellent restorer and wields a skillful brush. He is modest, shuns publicity, and can hold his tongue."

"Are you sure he can be relied upon?"

"I certainly am. Incidentally, you have seen one of his works at Chrysler's. I mean Rubens' *Flora* which has created a sensation in New York."

"Oh, that... But don't you think, Henri, that Rubens is easier to forge than Leonardo? It's not much of a problem for a professsional to reproduce his pearly semi-tones."

"Here you are mistaken. Rubens created no pearly semi-tones – they did not fit into the colour scheme he favoured. These effects appeared late after the brown shades of the ground paints had shown through the top white tones. An experienced falsifier ought to take these tone-caused changes into account."

"Have you found the man capable of smuggling the *Gioconda* out of the Louvre?"

"I have. He is an émigré patriot, naive, uneducated and not too bright. And a romantic one, like all Italians. My men have played on his feelings: the painting, they told him, was Italy's national property misappropriated by the French and had to be returned home."

"Will he be able to do it, not being a professional?"

"When it comes to a serious job, I'd rather entrust it to an amateur because amateurs act in a less predictable way than professionals do."

"When are you going to do the job?"

"End of August, when the Louvre is under repair. My romantic fellow will take the *Gioconda* out, get rid of the frame and pass the painting on to the men waiting outside. He regards them as Italian patriots like himself who will take care of the treasure in the early posttheft days when all of the Paris police is committed to action, and help him escape to Italy. They will give the picture back to him on a month or two, and the real *Mona Lisa* will grace your collection."

"What about the other one?"

"The other one will find itself in the Louvre pretty soon because my romantic friend will be arrested in Italy."

"If all goes according to plan, you'll get another half a million. Do you think he'll make it?"

"There is no cause for concern, I'm sure."

On the morning of August 21, 1911, Vincenzo Perugia – a wall-painter and a glazier who had helped a team of Italian repairmen refurbish the Louvre – walked out of the museum with the *Gioconda* under his wide shirt. It turned out to be amazingly easy to smuggle out this rectangular canvas which measured 54 by 79 cm. For



two days, the painting graced the interior of Vincenzo's garret. Then his new friends came over to fetch it. Two months later, after the turmoil caused by the theft had subsided a little, they gave the Gioconda back to him. She smiled at her "abductor," the wall-painter, for two subsequent years. Then Perugia took it to his home country where he was arrested. The *Mona Lisa* returned to the Loufre and Vincenzo was released from jail a year later. A top-notch lawyer had been hired to handle his case.

Two men lounged over a table in a private room of the Savoy restaurant, Paris.

"Thanks for lunch, Henri, I enjoyed it," said Bang's guest, a tall, lean and nervous middle-aged man. "Now we can talk business, I guess. What do you have to tell me?"

"Charles Dileny has died in a fire in his Boston mansion."

"Can this affect our business in any way?"

"Not at all, Pierre. The thing is that the fire has gutted Dileny's picture collection, including the *Mona Lisa...*"

Silence set in. Pierre put down his glass at the edge of the table and leaned back in his chair. His dark face turned deathly pale. He sat perfectly still, and that stillness betrayed how shocked he was by the news.

"So the *Mona Lisa* is no more," he said, at last, his voice tremblings with emotion.

"The *Mona Lisa* is no more," Henri Bang echoed.

Suddenly, Pierre opened his eyes wide. With flashing eyes, he lifted his head high and gazed at Bang. He refilled his glass without looking away.

"The *Gioconda* is dead. Long live the *Gioconda!*"

Bang followed suit with a smile and raised his snifter.

"I regard this as the work of Divine Providence," Pierre said excitedly, rubbing his hands together. "I have always been denied recognition even though I'm every bit as good as Rembrandt, Rubens, and Leonardo. I've been ignored, no one has taken me seriously. And today my picture is the world's best. All right, only the two of us know the painting is mine – so what? That's quite enough for me. I am an artist of genius, and I despise those two-bit 'experts,' I'm head and shoulders above them. I have known all along that Providence would help me sooner or later. And now my dream has come true!"

Struck dumb, Bang gaped at Pierre who was no longer the modest Pierre he had known before.

"Has my little speech shocked you? Surely, it's funny hearing me, Pierre Peruchot, a failure, a dauber on hire, say things like that. But now it's my turn to laugh, and I'll sure keep laughing. He who laughs alone laughs best."

Bang kept silent. Finally he put his elbows on the table, grinned, and lit a Havana.

"I have a confession to make, Pierre," he said. "I must say this, as much as I hate to disappoint you. Excessive pride, you see, should not go unpunished."

"What do you mean?"

"After you'd finished work, I called on you at your studio, remember? The two *Giocondas* were indistinguishable. Yours was propped up against the back of the sofa, and the original stood by wall. While you were down in the kitchen making coffee, I put your picture next to Leonardo's and tried to tell one from the other, but couldn't. I turned them around, and found that the Louvre markings on their backs were exactly identical, too. I shuffled the two pictures like cards until I finally realized, to my utter dismay, that I didn't know which was which."

"What are you trying to say?"

Pierre breathed out, his voice reduced to a whisper.

"Just what I'm saying... The picture which was burned in Boston might have been yours – or Leonardo's. The one on display in the Louvre may be by you, or by Leonardo. Its fifty-fifty, as the Americans say."

"You thought this up just now in order to crush me. You are envious of my good luck..."

"Take it easy, Pierre. I'm sorry things have worked out that way. As they say, man proposes and God disposes."

Overwhelmed, Pierre was rendered speechless. He sat there at the table with his shoulders hunched up for a long time until Bang helped him to his feet and led him to a cab stand. Although he kept his eyes closed all the way home, he still saw the *Mona Lisa* smiling quizzicaly, and that was unbearable...

A role

A psychiatrist's comment on freemasonphobia

In Moscow's St. Vlasy Church, converted into a concert hall, the Russian Classics creative centre presented a programme recently devoted to the 150th anniversary of Mikhail Lermontov's tragic death. Death is not an occasion for noisy celebration; therefore, the mood of the soiree was that of serenity and intellectual refinement.

It all went smoothly until Nikolai Burlyayev made his appearance on the stage. I knew him as an actor who had played in excellent films by Andrei Tarkovsky (*Ivan's Childhood* and *Andrei Rublev*) and then, after a long silence, became a film director to make an indifferent movie about Lermontov and a screen version of Vasily Belov's scandalous and vapid novel *Looking Ahead*. That was all I knew about Burlyayev whom I had never before seen in person.

The actor looked as if he was performing the role of a fanatic: gaunt, aggressive, with an unhealthy gleam in his eye. He delivered a voluble and hysterical tirade about his love for Lermontov, and then announced that Lermontov had fallen victim to a freemason conspiracy and stressed, repeatedly, that the father of the poet's murderer was named Solomon.

I am sorry for those who call themselves "patriot but who are ignorant of the fact that the Russian nobility (which Nikolai Martynov, who had challenged Lermontov to the fatal duel, belonged to) was not averse to giving its posterity Biblical names. In fact, it had never occurred to the Russian nobility that centuries later "patriots" would find this practice seditious, that they wouldn't forgive even Christ himself for his mother having been Jewish.

The actor-director's aggressive ignorance, his morbid suspiciousness, his obsession with the idea of the all-powerful freemasons' global conspiracy took the audience aback. Knowing that I was a psychiatrist, some of those present asked whether he was a patient of mine.

A psychiatrist is of no help in such cases. Freemasonphobia is a form of ideological madness. It is akin to the ravings of a jealous person who goes by "logical deductions" but has no factual evidence for them.

The less gifted a person, the more convinced he is that there exist some secret forces which suppress his talent.

Ideological insanity was not born yesterday, nor is it likely to die tomorrow. The psychological types given to such ravings are, most unfortunately, immortal. The forms of ideological insanity will vary, but its basic nature will always remain the same – I am pessimistic about that.

Today these people are trying to assure us that Lermontov, Pushkin, Yesenin, and a host of other celebrities have been destroyed by secret forces out to deprive great Russia of its best sons. A century or two ago, similar freemasonphobes said the same thing except that the names they mentioned were different. Characteristic of Russian freemasonphobes have been, at all times, oversuspiciousness, obsession with fears, messianic arrogance, and national conceit.

On January 15, 1831, General Andrei Borisovich Golitsyn submitted a report to Emperor Nicholas I claiming that all Russia had long fallen under the influence of freemasons who were after "enforcing cosmopolitism" and who, in pursuance of that objective, incited the populace to anti-government riots, created limitless red tape, and encouraged all the 40,000 civil servants of the country to harm Russia.

The vigilant general's prejudice against the civil servants is understandable. Incidentally, he was a freemason himself, as were the persons he informed against, such a Pushkin, Zhukovsky, Benkendorf, and innumerable other individuals dissimilar in their views, social positions, and calibres. Being a freemason was the fashion then – people played that social game without committing themselves in any way. A good half of the Russian nobility was affiliated with the Masonic Lodge, and there were even more freemasons in Europe.

Had the freemasons known that their very existence was subject of speculation for the mentally deranged, they would have dissolved the Lodge of their own free will. Why all that talk about the freemasons? The idea is to distact the people from the effort for democracy, to have them apply their energy to fighting the "masons" instead. There are strictly practical, real motives behind freemasonphobia. Many stand to gain from supporting freemasonphobia.

Let us go back to our overvigilant general devoid of any sense of humour. He was convinced that the ill-intentioned freemasons were set on destroying the wretched Russians, making nymphomaniacs of all the decent ladies, poisoning all the food. In his extreme nationalism, General Golitsyn had a point about the "aliens," complaining that "there was no room left in Russia for true Russians".

According to Golitsyn, the "aliens – Poles and Germans – had entrenched themselves in the Masonic Lodge (today freemasons are identified with Jews.)

The general warned his monarch that Poles accounted for about 7,000 of St. Petersburg's population and were preparing to seize the Winter Palace shortly.

What was the reaction to that on the part of the Emperor whom many of his contemporaries did not regard as the wisest man in Russia? Nicholas I perused Golitsyn's report and then inscribed on the margin: "Where is the proof of that?"

A commission set up to check Golitsyn's report found not a bit of evidence in support of his allegations. The report was relegated to the archives, and the Emperor banished the unmasker of the scheming freemason to his country estate, out of sight. The general took the Great Reform of February 19, 1861, as a triumph for the cunning freemasons.

Some people just cannot live without hating anyone or suspecting those around them of crafty designs. Their ideas are based on hate, conceit, and fear. Diffident, obsessed with complexes, pitiful, they are hemmed-in, opinionated and won't listen to reason, especially when they stick together in a closely-knit pack. Nevertheless, we ought to pity them and hope that doctors will find a cure for their condition some time.

This is what I was thinking about as I listened to Nikolai Burlyayev's speech permeated with violent hatred for some secret organizations which had killed Lermontov and which were now at work trying to wipe out the Pamyat society's favourites. It is a shame that the great poet has become a card in the national-patriot's game.

Mikhail Buyanov,
Cand. Sc. (Medicine)

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